" It remains extremely difficult to determine to what extent
these periodic reversals of capital flows have been themselves the cause
of crises or a response to fundamental economic problems in the borrowing
economies. Certainly such reversals have responded to excessive levels
of debt, terms-of-trade shocks, or other events that reduce the prospects
for economic growth in the borrowing countries. However, actions by
creditor countries or lending institutions also have contributed. Crises
have been sparked by monetary tightening in creditor countries and sudden
changes in tolerance for risk on the part of lenders. Creditors have
also contributed to crises by continuing to lend even in the face of
evidence that funds were being directed to activities that could not
generate sufficient returns with which to repay the debts created."
(World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000, Washington, D.
C., page 120).
On a similar note, the World Bank report is cautious about reacting
to the possibility of a renewed spurt in capital flows to developing
countries such as India, the prospect of which currently causes so much
excitement among our own policy makers. Thus, while it recognises that
the current pause in capital flows could last for some years, it also
suggests that factors such as continued technological progress, rapid
economic growth, a favourable political climate, and the ageing of industrial
country populations (compared to the much younger age structure of most
emerging markets) may well lead to a renewed boom in capital flows to
emerging markets over the next decade.
The point, however, is that even such a renewed boom is not seen as
necessarily a cause for celebration among the host emerging economies.
Thus, the report argues that "if these inflows continue to be as
volatile as they have been in the past, their benefits to the developing
world may be reduced. Also, the spread of capital flows to countries
with weak institutional capacity may increase the likelihood of crises
in those economies. The great differences in incomes, legal and institutional
frameworks, and cultural backgrounds between creditors and borrowers
will tend to heighten the effects of asymmetric information and encourage
herding among lenders. The growing role of banking systems in emerging
markets in intermediating volatile capital flows could lead to greater
risk to financial systems and could intensify the devastating effects
of crises on economic output, particularly given the weakness of banking
systems in many countries. Finally, continued financial innovation is
likely to facilitate speculation and the rapid shifting of flows in
and out of emerging markets." (page 120)
To counter these possible adverse consequences
(note, of the boom in inflows as well, not just of the slump),
the World Bank appears to have made a giant leap in its thinking in
terms of recognising the relevance and viability of some capital controls.
(Or could it just be the public swan song of the institution's departing
Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz ?) Thus the report seriously considers
a variety of capital control measures, ranging from taxation of short-term
capital inflows to prudential controls on capital inflows, and also
controls on capital outflows during crisis episodes along with liquidity-enhancing
measures such as higher foreign currency reserves and contingent access
to international credit. It allows that both the "market-friendly"
prudential measures regulating inflows in Chile and the mid-crisis measures
to control capital flight in Malaysia could have played important roles.
But what is most important is that the report accepts that such controls
need to be developed within countries according to specific requirements
of particular economies.
Certainly the report recognises that such safeguards would impose
costs on the domestic economy either by restricting the quantity of
foreign borrowing or by raising its price. However, it quite sensibly
points out that such costs are clearly likely to be less than the cost
of a full-fledged financial crisis. What is even more significant is
that finally the Bank also recognises the distributive element in such
policy choices, since financial crises typically make the poor pay for
the subsequent adjustment by bringing about fairly deep recessions which
increase both unemployment and poverty. Regulations on capital flow,
by contrast, tend to put a greater part of the adjustment on to those
who actually benefit more directly from foreign borrowing.
All this is no more than a rather belated recognition (by an institution
that is known for belated and partial responses) of the hard reality
broadcast by the succession of financial crises that have hit emerging
markets over the 1990s. But in the context of the currently ruling economic
ideology in India, it appears not just heretical but impossible in terms
of gaining official acceptance, if only because this echoes belatedly
much of what Indian critics have written about the policies being followed
in our country at the behest of the Bretton Woods institutions.
Obviously, the time will eventually come when these ideas are accepted
generally by Indian policy makers and their economists as well. It remains
to be seen whether this will simply follow the usual intellectual time-lag,
or will be the result of bitter experience.