In fact, the Exim Policy statement does not even mention these issues,
much less discuss ways in which such problems could be dealt with. One of
the most urgent problems for goods exporters relates to the backlog and
slow rate of movement through India's ports, which raises costs and
affects markets for export goods. The problems of poor transport in
general and unstable (and increasingly expensive) access to power and
other essential inputs put domestic producers at a major disadvantage
compared to their international competitors. Another major area of concern
is the difficulty faced by small-scale exporters in raising bank credit,
especially after financial liberalisation measures have reduced
allocations for priority sector credit.
Obviously, it would be too
much to expect the Commerce Ministry alone to tackle these issues. But
since these are among the most important constraints on India's exports
currently, it was to be expected that the Commerce Minister would take
note of these and at least try to co-ordinate with other Ministries such
as Power and Surface Transport in order to ensure some cohesive policy
with respect to these problems. (Instead, the only co-ordination seems to
have been with the Ministry of Finance, and that too, only because the
strategy conforms to the Finance Ministry's known approach of preferring
tax giveaways to increased public productive expenditure.)
Sustained export expansion requires a more comprehensive and systematic
macro strategy on the part of the government, which includes a substantial
increase in public infrastructure spending. Such a strategy would also end
up improving conditions for producers for the domestic market as well, and
therefore aggregate employment conditions.
Sadly, the Exim Policy does
not appear to have recognised this at all. Instead, it sticks within the
now familiar and largely discredited “liberalisation” paradigm, in which
it is assumed that deregulation and tax sops will be sufficient to make
private producers not only increase production but also improve
productivity. In fact, the only evidence of some strategic orientation is
the launch of the new “Focus Africa” programme, which is certainly
welcome.
Consistent with the basic market-determined framework, the main focus of
the new Exim Policy exercise is on a range of measures that will further
liberalise the export trade, especially with respect to agricultural
exports, and on providing some fiscal incentives including duty
neutralisation and other tax sops to exporters. It also relies on more
Special Economic Zones, provided with even more incentives, to take up the
task of export promotion, even though the experience with Export
Processing Zones so far has been dismal.
For
agriculture, the Policy contains a number of measures. Quantitative
restrictions have been lifted on exports of all commodities except onion
and jute. There is provision for a transport subsidy for exports of fresh
and processed fruits, vegetables, floriculture, poultry, dairy products
and products of wheat and rice. Registration requirements, which were
earlier necessary for farm exports, have been removed. The minimum export
price condition has been lifted. While these will obviously reduce
bureaucratic delays and assist more exports, there are questions about how
small cultivators facing large and often monopsonistic distributors would
able to manage in the new scenario in which they are to face these forces
without any element of mediation.
The Commerce Ministry obviously wants to assist the Food Ministry in
getting rid of the embarassingly large public stocks of foodgrains through
more exports. It is quite happy to assist in a process which will deprive
millions of poor hungry people within India of access to such grain, in
order to push this grain out as (implictly) subsidised exports. Of course,
this attempt may come up against WTO regulations, so the Exim Policy
proposes an internal transport subsidy on movement of foodgrain from FCI
godowns to the nearest port, which it believes will bypass the WTO
restrictions.
In addition to all this,
twenty agri-export zones (AEZs) have been sanctioned, covering mainly
horticultural products. Mr. Maran is clearly a keen promoter of such zones
: past Exim Policies have witnessed the declaration of various Special
Economic Zones. The 13 existing SEZs are also to be allowed to open
overseas banking units, which are effectively offshore banks free from
domestic restrictions such as those on Cash-Reserve ratio and Statutory
Liquidity Ratio. In addition, they have been promised tax concessions as
well.
Now
"cluster
town" such as Tirupur, Ludhiana and Panipat are also to be
provided with similar status, in the form of various fiscal incentives.
Thus far, of course, such incentives have not made much difference to the
actual export performance of these areas or sectors, although they imply
quite a lot of tax revenue foregone in the interests of providing export
incentives.
The other main plank of the
new Exim Policy is the provision of a range of fiscal concessions and tax
sops to exporters under various schemes. Mr. Maran has probably extracted
more fiscal sops for exporters than any previous Commerce Minister, even
though export performance has not displayed any greater dynamism as a
result. Already over the fiscal year just concluded, the revenue loss from
the various export promotion schemes is estimated to have been as high as
Rs. 23,000 crore or more. In 2002-03, rough calculations suggest that
revenue outgo could amount to more than Rs. 27,000 crore, or 60 per cent
of budgeted customs duty collection !
It is interesting that this has been allowed by the same Finance Ministry
that has prevented increased allocation for public employment schemes that
would have increased rural employment, provided rural infrastructure and
helped dispose of the excess food stocks. Since revenue foregone is in
budgetary terms analogous to increased expenditure, this also means that
nearly Rs. 30,000 crore which could have been spent on improving
infrastructure conditions even for exporters, has instead been diverted to
lining the pockets of some exporters. The past experience with such sops
suggests that this would not necessarily lead to increased exports either.
Of course, one plausibly question the basic approach of
this Exim Policy, which privileges export growth as the main objective of
trade strategy and as the engine of Indian development. But the point is
that, even within this framework, the approach adopted by the Commerce
Minister is unlikely to deliver in terms of improved export performance,
even while it wastes thousands of crores from the public exchequer that
could be used for more productive purposes.