Having
completed this operation, the top management of the Tata group chose to
launch its strategy of holding individuals like Pendse and Talaulicar
responsible for all the transactions of TFL. It had already appointed a
team from A.F. Ferguson, the reputed auditing and consulting firm,
headed by senior partner Y.M. Kale to conduct an investigation into TFL,
ostensibly to identify how the management systems failed and to work out
remedial measures. It also sacked Pendse and lodged complaints against
him with the police and the Securities and Exchange Board of India,
alleging fraudulent transactions.
The current round of the controversy relates to the response of the Tata
management to the Kale report. The report, a serious exercise running
into 904 pages, not merely finds Tata Finance's corporate governance
practices wanting, but identifies other members of the board, besides
Pendse, who could not have been ignorant of the concerned transactions
and specifically criticises some such as then TFL Director Kishore
Chaukar.
While full details of the now-suppressed report are not available, a
leak to the press suggests that it identified several questionable
transactions in the form of intra-group investments that helped some
companies of the Tata group such as Tata Chemicals and Telco to book
profits and declare dividends. According to reports, the study suggested
that the nature of a number of transactions "raise doubts as to whether
these were conducted to generate book profits or merely facilitate
regulatory compliance." In its view there was need to ascertain whether
under the erstwhile TFL management there was "a pattern of using
circular intra-group transactions, mostly to either book profits for
some of the companies in the group as and when required, or merely
facilitate regulatory compliance."
A few examples of such transactions are available from the press. The
picture that emerges is one where a large number of oddly titled firms,
which fall within the Tata group, undertake transactions aimed at
allowing a particular firm to record profits and pay-out dividends.
Thus, a group company IECIL first accepts large inter-corporate deposits
from other group companies, for which it pays out interest estimated at
Rs. 0.68 crore. On March 31 2000, the money obtained through these
deposits is used to buy 13.3 lakh shares of Tata Finance Ltd for Rs.
12.6 crore from Sheba Properties, a subsidiary of Telco. This allows
Sheba Properties to declare a profit, against which a dividend of Rs.
6.5 crore is paid out.
The other set of transactions noted by the report was that when TFL
reached inter-corporate deposit limits and could not access further
funds from group companies through this route to finance its
transactions, it would sell shares to group companies through
'ready-forward transactions', where the company sold shares today to
access funds, only to buy back the shares at some later date. Thus it
appears that TFL and Nishkalp provided finance in the form of ICDs to
Inshahallah Investments Ltd. (IIL), which then bought shares of TFL. TFL
(and Nishkalp) earned interest income from these ICDs and TFL booked
profits on the sale of its shares.
Clearly, since there were a large number of other companies such as Tata
Chemicals and Telco which benefited from TFL's activities, it is
difficult to sustain the position that the Tata management was unaware
of the activities of TFL. Based on its examination of transactions of
these kinds, the Ferguson team delivered its indictment: "How could so
many questionable transactions even be discussed, let alone actually
contracted or recorded, by senior officials of such reputed companies,
even on the assumption that someone wielding authority had proposed
these transactions? In other words, even if the suggestion to commit
irregularities had emanated from a few, how were these acquiesced to by
so many? How did these not arouse widespread consternation and why did
they not rush to report the goings on to the board of Tata Finance/Nishkalp
Investments or even higher?" In sum, there was little possibility that
the rest of the groups top management was ignorant of the developments
in TFL.
Within days of its submission, the report is 'rejected' by the Tata
management and "withdrawn" by the auditing firm, which has commissioned
a fresh report based on the information collected. The leak soon makes
clear that the report was not received well because it implicates more
than just Dr. Pendse with knowledge of the suspect transactions. Soon
thereafter, Y.M. Kale is reported to have resigned his position as
senior partner of Ferguson, ostensibly on the grounds that he does not
approve of the decision of the firm to withdraw the report and rewrite
it. But Ferguson itself declares that he had not resigned but had been
"sacked" since the firm had lost faith in him after taking account of
the "inaccuracies" in the report pointed out by TFL Chairman Ishaat
Hussain. Meanwhile, Pendse himself publicly declares that he has been
made a scapegoat by the group to clear itself of involvement in
transactions that he claimed the board was aware of and acquiesced in.
It is not surprising that the whole episode has set off speculation in
the media, which is damaging not just because of the involvement of a
Tata firm in the suspect transactions but because the group's management
is seen to have extracted a toll from a forthright auditor, to save its
reputation. The fact that the auditing firm involved is one of India's
leading auditors only further undermines confidence in governance of
what was considered the best segment of India's corporate sector. The
audit firm went to the extent of claiming that, since the Rs. 2.5 crore
it earned from the Tata group was an "insignificant amount" when
compared to its gross annual fees, it cannot be seen as having withdrawn
the report and sacked Kale under pressure from the Tata's. In fact, the
Tata's took it upon themselves to declare that Kale's "cessation from
his partnership", was "the result of a decision that was unanimously
taken by the partners following a detailed internal enquiry." If the
distance between the client and the auditor was as much as it has been
claimed to be, it would have been best to leave such explanations to the
audit firm.
There are three conclusions that emerge from the limited information we
have about this episode, which is to do with the behaviour of even
reputed business groups or firms like Tata and Ferguson. First the fact
that the business group consists of a large number of companies,
straddling different areas of economic activity, implies that a number
of ostensibly "arms length" transactions between legally independent
firms are actually part of the group as a single entity. This has, to an
extent, been always true of the corporate sector in India. But
liberalisation that has substantially diluted regulations imposed on the
big business groups has possibly increased such transactions
substantially. Secondly, the Tatafin episode reveals that, in the wake
of liberalisation, which includes financial liberalisation, these
transactions include financial transactions that allow core firms in the
group and possibly the central decision-making authority to book profits
and earn high returns through dividends. Those dividends may even serve
to inflate prices of listed firms in the market. Finally, even the best
in the auditing business in India are not independent of the clients
they serve, as is indeed true elsewhere in the world as well.
What bothers some is that even the Tata group, with its
reputation for good management and its tendency to be in a business for
the long run, has succumbed to the lure of lucre that the speculation
promoted by financial liberalisation holds out. Clearly, this is the way
liberalisation is refashioning Indian capital. Its influence is clearly
strong enough to transform even the best. Unfortunately for the Tata
group and fortunately for the rest of India, they lost out on their
gamble. If not, the illusion that scams are not systemic but the result
of bad practices by a few rogue businessmen would have still prevailed.