It
was an avoidable diversion. While parliament was in session, the cabinet
met to approve hitherto prohibited foreign direct investment in multi-brand
retail, with a cap of 51 per cent on foreign equity that ensures majority
ownership. Simultaneously the cap on foreign equity investment in
single-brand retail has been enhanced to 100 per cent, offering sole
ownership rights to foreign investors. Opposition to the move resulted
in the virtual suspension of an already stalled parliament. Finally,
the audacious attempt of the UPA II to push through these controversial
proposals had to be finally revoked till a "consensus" is
found. Since a proposal that did not even enjoy a parliamentary majority
is unlikely to be accepted by consensus, this is nothing but a rollback.
The Manmohan Singh government had clearly not bargained for this defeat.
Experience with the nuclear deal under UPA I had perhaps convinced
it that in the event of a vote in a discussion on the policy, it could
somehow find a majority. It was only when its own allies in government
expressed their dissent and threatened to abstain or vote against
the measure that the retreat was seen as inevitable.
Thus, this is not a defeat of just this policy. It is also amounts
to the censure of the political practice in which a government that
is losing credibility seeks to use an executive decision to override
something the Parliament will not allow. Sections in the government
may believe that this policy and the framework to which it belongs
are good for the country. But they also must be familiar with the
arguments being advanced by those who are critical of the policy.
It is those arguments they sought to dismiss when pushing ahead with
the FDI agenda.
Consider those arguments. They begin with the view that once the doors
to foreign investment in the retail sector are opened, giant international
retailers such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Metro would use the opportunity
to get a share of the large Indian market. This is based on evidence
on the pace of penetration of organised retail (led by transnational
firms) into developing countries, including those in Asia. An analysis
by researchers from Michigan State University and the International
Food Policy Research Institute on developments in Asia during 2001
to 2009 found that while domestic conglomerates have played a role
in the rapid growth of organised retail in China, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand, the presence of foreign firms has grown substantially.
Moreover, evidence from the developed countries shows that such growth
is followed by a process of consolidation in which a few global retail
chains tend to be the winners.
The names of some of these retail chains are now well known. Foreign
sales have been an important source of revenue for many of them, amounting
in 2007 to as much as 74 per cent in the case of Ahold of Netherlands,
52 per cent for Carrefour of France, 53 per cent for Metro of Germany,
22 per cent for Tesco of UK and 20 per cent for Wal-Mart of USA. Wal-Mart's
20 per cent too has to be seen in context: with $379 billion of revenues
in 2007 it stood way ahead of Carrefour, which came in second with
$123 billion in the global league table for revenues.
The debate on FDI in retail revolves around the consequences that
the growing presence and rising market share of these global giants
would have. The power of these chains has been amply illustrated in
other contexts, where they have been in operation. With deep pockets
and international sourcing capabilities, they exploit economies in
procurement, storage and distribution to outcompete and displace domestic
intermediaries in the supply chain. This occurs not in one or a few
centres, since each retail chain tends to establish procurement, warehousing
and distribution facilities across regions and cities. Once the smaller
middlemen are displaced, we have a few large firms and their agents
dealing with a multitude of small, medium and relatively large producers
on the one side, and a mass of consumers on the other.
Structurally this interaction between a few powerful intermediaries
and a large number of producers and consumers provides the basis for
an increase in trade margins at the expense of prices paid to producers
or charged to consumers. The giant "middlemen" appropriate
these higher margins. That a part of the margin may be shared with
the producer or consumer to increase retail volumes and market shares
does not take away from the fact that the distribution of power within
the supply chain benefits the large intermediary.
There are three issues of particular concern that arise. The first
is the impact that the transformation in retail would have on small
producers, especially in the farm sector. Though large, organised
retail outlets tend to attract consumers by offering a diverse range
of products at a single location, there is a tendency to standardise
each of the products on offer. This involves closer interaction with
the supplier and changes in farming practices, often leading to rising
costs for the producer and necessitating increased access to working
capital. To the extent that this results in the subordination of the
producer to the buyer or the buyer's agents, transactions are no more
arms length in nature. The danger is that the prices paid to and returns
earned by small suppliers would be depressed because a few buyers
dominate the trade. Moreover, dependence on a few buyers could mean
that when the market is lean the producer is forced to bear a disproportionate
share of the burden through measures such as delay in payments. Given
the precarious viability of crop production even at present, such
changes could severely damage livelihoods.
It is of course true that agriculture is not a homogenous sector,
with farmers of different types and sizes engaged in production. The
larger farmers with accumulated surpluses or easier access to official
credit may benefit from the transformation in retail. It is the experience
of farmers such as these that are often reported when the case is
made that farmers favour FDI-led large retail. But they are by no
means the majority, and not all of them are likely to experience an
improvement once the transformation occurs. Moreover, since global
chains are allowed to and are equipped to source supplies from anywhere
in the world, these large farmers just as the smaller farmers would
be subject to competition from the cheapest global sources. They could
be shut off from access to consumer unless they accept a significant
reduction in prices. Adverse effects on employment and earnings are
therefore a real possibility.
The second concern is that even when farmers' earnings are under pressure,
consumers may not benefit from the promised reduction in prices resulting
from cost economies and the benefits of scale accruing to large intermediaries.
Lower prices for consumers may be the initial fallout when existing
intermediaries are being competed out to provide the space for the
large retailers. But, once the retail trade is concentrated in a few
firms, retail margins themselves could rise, with implications for
prices paid by the consumer, especially in years when domestic supply
falls short.
Finally, within the supply chain itself, a range of pre-existing operators
would be displaced, varying from street vendors and kirana stores
to medium and large wholesale dealers. The latter would be rendered
irrelevant by the ability of large conglomerates to directly contract
with and procure from producers. The immediate and direct effect would
be a substantial loss of employment in the small and unorganised retail
trade as well as in segments of the wholesale trade displaced by the
big retail chains.
The potential significance of this impact can be judged from the role
of the retail and wholesale trade in generating employment in the
country. According to the National Sample Survey Office's survey of
employment and unemployment in 2009-10, the service sector category
that includes the wholesale and retail trade (besides the much smaller
repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods),
provided jobs for 44 million in the total work force of 459 million.
It is no doubt true that the impact of foreign-invested retail would
be restricted to the urban areas since entry as of now is permitted
only in cities with a population of more than one million. But this
is where the employment in trade would be the highest. Twenty-six
out of the 44 million employed in the sector are located in urban
areas. Many of these workers find themselves in the services sector
(especially in the retail trade) because of inadequate employment
opportunities in agriculture and manufacturing. Out of 71 million
jobs in services in the urban areas, around 36 per cent are in the
retail and wholesale trade and repair services. In sum, from an employment
point of view this is a sector that is central to livelihoods, however,
precarious some of those jobs can be. As an "employer of last
resort", it serves as a poor substitute for the missing social
security programme.
The government denies that the entry of large retail led by transnational
firms would affect employment adversely. Since it is difficult to
argue that a form of retail trade that relies on scale, technology
and capital intensity to reduce costs would generate more direct employment
than the less organised trade that it displaces, the focus is on indirect
employment. Adequate new jobs would be created elsewhere in the supply
chain, it is argued, even if not in the supermarkets themselves. This
is an area where estimates are speculative at best and are therefore
not persuasive. So the fall-back argument is that the Indian version
of the policy has been designed to counter any adverse consequences
for employment. But this is not convincing either. The attempt to
temper the adverse impact on employment by restricting entry only
to cities with populations exceeding one million is without substance.
It does not change the source of the competition (giants like Wal-Mart,
Carrefour, Tesco and Metro) nor the locations in which such competition
is most likely to be faced. On the other hand, the requirement that
the foreign investor should bring in a minimum investment of $100
million implies that the FDI being sought is in units that are more
technology- and less labour-intensive.
Yet, the Commerce Minister's claim is that the policy has a "unique
Indian imprint" that would make its impact here very different.
This is a poor effort to obfuscate issues. Consider one aspect of
the unique imprint: the requirement that 30 per cent of manufactured
or processed products sold should be sourced from small and medium
enterprises. This requirement based on a process of self-certification
that is to be monitored would be difficult to implement even in India.
But it becomes meaningless because it applies to such producers from
anywhere in the world. As a briefing paper from the Commerce Ministry
notes, in order to ensure that there is no violation of World Trade
Organisation norms, "30 per cent sourcing is to be done from
micro and small enterprises which can be done from anywhere in the
world and is not India specific." This would be impossible to
implement and only encourage international sourcing at the expense
of domestic producers.
In sum, there are sufficient grounds to be wary of the impact that
FDI would have in a sector that is the employer of last resort in
a country where even high GDP growth is not delivering jobs. If the
government was still insisting on pushing ahead with the measure there
must be significant collateral benefits. Those benefits are, however,
not clearly identified. As of now the retail chain works well, with
different segments catering to different demands in terms of the desired
combination of price and minimum quality. There are no noticeable
shortages, and a large and diverse country is well serviced. So the
government has taken recourse to specious arguments. Nobody buys the
argument, for example, that FDI in retail is a remedy for the relentless
inflation the country faces. Dealing with that inflation requires
addressing cost-push factors and getting government (not FDI) to plug
the gaps that the private sector will not fill. A weak segment of
the supply chain is the public distribution system created to ensure
remunerative prices for farmers and reasonable prices for consumers.
That and productivity enhancing public investment are among the areas
that need the government's attention.
The government's misplaced obsession with this policy is therefore
difficult to understand. Some have read the sudden announcement as
a symbolic declaration of the commitment to neoliberal reform of a
government paralysed by charges of abetting corruption and shielding
black money and by failures ranging from persisting inflation to faltering
industrial growth. Others have attributed it to a desire to please
international investors and governments like the US that have lobbied
for such measures. The US government officially welcomed the policy
when it was announced. That lends credence to this interpretation.
Fortunately, even if true, this limited and skewed agenda of those
designing UPA II's economic policy has not enough takers even in the
political establishment. Not because all of them are gains FDI in
retail. It is because they are not foolish enough to lose sight of
the many elections to come. Political democracy has delivered on this
occasion.
*
This article was originally published
in the Frontline, Volume 28 - Issue 26 :: Dec. 17-30, 2011.