Three factors appear to
explain this trend. First, a speculative boom in IT stocks in general and
internet stocks in particular in American markets. Second, the fact that among
emerging markets India is a country with a growing IT presence, in US markets,
strengthened by strategic alliances with leading US firms. Finally, the fact
that those Indian firms that have gone in for a NASDAQ listing in American
markets have performed quite well, encouraging other Indian firms in the IT
and entertainment sectors to contemplate a similar strategy.
These factors have virtually ensured that the speculative fever in IT and
related stocks in American markets has spilt over into the Indian market. For
example, the bull run in Wipro shares came in the wake of two major strategic
alliances it had forged with Microsoft, the software giant, and Symbian, the
combination of leading players targeting the emerging market for wireless
devices that link to the internet. It should be expected that a similar trend
would obtain in other areas like the entertainment business where the
integration of Indian operators with international players is significant.
While demand for Indian equity in selected sectors is spurred by these
factors, the supply of such shares is limited for two reasons: first,
internationally acceptable players are still small in number, even if
increasing over time; and, second, the number of shares from such enterprises
that are available in the market are limited. As mentioned earlier, only 25
per cent of Wipro shares are with the "public" as opposed to the promoter, and
most of those holding such shares are unlikely to be ready to part with them
in the course of a boom. The net result is that the demand-supply balance at
the margin is heavily weighted in favour of sellers, resulting in astronomical
price increases in short periods of time. This is true of other companies as
well. Needless to say, if many promoters chose to exploit the situation by
off-loading a significant chunk of their holding, the demand-supply balance
for shares of individual companies could change substantially, resulting in a
fall in prices that is as dramatic as the previous rise.
Despite this dependence of share prices on the limited supply resulting from a
high holding by the promoter and their associates, the market capitalisation
index applies the price at the margin to value the stock of the company. This
results in a dramatic surge in the "market value" of the company along with
the price. Not surprisingly, a few firms and sectors account for the recent
surge in market capitalisation. By mid-February, Wipro alone accounted for 15
per cent of market capitalisation in the BSE and the combined market value of
around 150 software companies accounts for 32 per cent. It must be remembered
that at the beginning of the 1990s, these companies hardly featured in the BSE.
In short, India's new found wealth is like a pyramid of cards built by a bunch
of flighty investors. Small money by world standards is rushing into a few
sectors, honing in on a few companies which have a small number of shares on
trade. This pushes up prices at the margin to create an illusion of wealth
even as the economy trudges along the same old growth rate, because the
commodity producing sectors, especially agriculture languish. But for the boys
at the top, things appear as if they could not have been better.
All this would have mattered little if the implications for the real economy
were not adverse. To start with, the rush of dollars into the economy comes at
a time when a recession induced deceleration in non-oil imports and large
remittances from Indian working abroad has kept the current account deficit at
relatively low levels. This increases the supply of dollars in the market and
would cause the exchange rate to appreciate, unless the RBI purchases these
dollars and adds them to its already large reserve of foreign currency assets.
Since an appreciation in the exchange rate would affect India's poorly
performing exports adversely, the RBI does increase its foreign asset holding,
which would contribute to an increase in money supply. But because a
monetarist mindset dominates the central bank and the government, they seek
other ways of controlling the growth in money supply. Principal among these is
a curb on central bank credit, especially to the government.
One consequence of this is that the government is forced to borrow from the
market at higher interest rates, even while keeping expenditure under control.
The net result is a fiscal crisis even when expenditure is being reined it.
This is taken as a case for curtailing expenditure further, even when
unutilised capacities in industry, declining capital formation in agriculture,
large food stocks with the FCI, substantial foreign reserves and low
inflation, all cry out for larger investment by the government. The State is
put in retreat precisely at a time when it should be expansionist, just
because a few flighty foreign investors have chosen to make themselves and a
few domestic entrepreneurs rich through games played on the stock market.
To top it all, these games of speculation are bound to give way to a crash in
stock prices when it becomes clear that there is nothing at present or in the
future which warrants a share to trade at 750 times the annualised per share
earnings of a company, as it does in the case of Wipro. When the fall begins,
much of the $11 billion of investment poured into India's stock markets since
the early 1990s may be withdrawn, setting off a run on reserves and a fall in
the currency. The implications of the financial crisis that can ensue need no
elaboration in the wake of the Southeast Asian experience. Crucially, such a
crisis sends the real sector into a steep recession, making the real sector
and those whose livelihoods depend on it, pay for the speculative inclinations
of a financial world repeatedly driven by shortsighted, speculative euphoria.