Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha protests too much. "I am not the Finance
Minister for the Bombay Stock Exchange," he is reported to have declared
in his reply to the debate on the Finance Bill for 2000-01. That remark
was just a bald response to accusations that economic policy in India,
whether formulated by the Finance Ministry or the central bank, is increasingly
shaped by the demands of Finance and the movements of the Sensex.
Unfortunately, Yashwant Sinha's actions do not match his rhetoric.
Consider the modifications to the original Budget proposals he has turned
down and those he has made. The Opposition and the Bharatiya Janata
Party's allies have been demanding a reduction or withdrawal of a spate
of increases in administered prices - of kerosene, liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG), fertilizers and food materials issued through the public
distribution system (PDS) - announced prior to and in the Budget. Their
demands, especially in the case of food, have acquired significance
in the wake of reports of pockets of severe drought in the country and
predictions that after a gap of 12 years the country is likely to experience
a bad monsoon in the year starting June.
Put together, these actual and likely developments provide a case for
preparatios for using the large foodstocks with the government for food-for-work
programmes as well as for provision at subsidised prices for those who
may be priced out of the open market by food price inflation in the
coming months. Both of these would involve an increase in the explicit
or implicit subsidy bill of the government. In such a situation the
argument that food policy should be driven by the objective of sharply
reducing food subsidies is not merely faulty in itself, as many have
argued, but comple tely unwarranted from a welfare point of view.
That the government too is unconvinced of its position should be clear
from the decision to offer an additional allocation of 20 kg of foodgrain
per capita to the drought-affected States, which would be sold at below
poverty line (BPL) rates even to those above the poverty line. However,
the demand to reduce the huge hike in the BPL rates has been ignored.
The combination of fiscal and monetary policies that are being put
in place appear to have been formulated with one eye on the market.
What is appalling, however, is that while Yashwant Sinha is counting
the government's paise when it comes to safeguarding the interests of
the millions who, even official statistics show, are either below or
at the margin of subsistence, he has been quit e happy appeasing the
well-to-do by forgoing revenues from direct taxes.
There are at least three modifications motivated by this concern of
his. First, a lower surcharge on income tax in the case of those whose
taxes are deducted at source, and higher exemption ceilings on interest
on housing loans and investments in infrastructure bonds for all income
tax payers. Second, a graded tax holiday for export-oriented units,
including those providing Information Technology-enabled services, provided
at a time when even many within the government have been arguing for
a tax on the huge export incomes earned by units supported in various
forms with largesse from the state. Third, exemption from income taxes
of stocks awarded to employees under the employees' stock option plans
(ESOPs), on the grounds that the revenues generated from the sale of
these stocks, as and when they are sold, would be subject to capital
gains tax.
The concessions implied by the first two of these moves are obvious.
The third needs closer examination. Stock options are virtually payments
"in kind" to employees, with a double edge. These payments are income,
even if they are incomes of a kind that are by definition "saved" and
"invested" in a specific form, and have, therefore, been considered
to be subject to income tax. By virtue of being savings invested in
financial assets, they can appreciate in value over the years, and if
that increase in value is encashed through a sale of the asset, the
additional earnings are subject to capital gains taxation as per the
rules prevailing at the time. It is no doubt true that ESOPs offered
by companies are most often accompanied by regulations as to when the
employee concerned can choose to sell them. And, in the interim the
price of the stock can decline, so that the actual income derived by
the individual may be lower than that on which he/she paid income tax
in the first instance.
This is a risk any individual accepting stock options must take, since
it is not the role of the government to encourage stock options as a
mode of compensation. However, stock options play a crucial role from
the point of view of the companies offering them and the stock market.
For companies, they provide a means of offering high and even astronomical
salaries, without damaging their cash flow situations; and for the markets,
the practice ensures a growing number of participants, which over the
years helps increase the volume of trading and extent of market capitalisation.
By choosing to abjure treating stock options as a "perquisite" and exempting
them from income tax the Finance Minister has, in effect, provided a
concession to firms and the markets at the expense of the state exchequer.
That Yashwant Sinha is prone to sacrificing revenue to appease the
stock markets has been demonstrated repeatedly. The most glaring instance
was when he reined in the tax authorities from ensuring tax payments
by a group of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) who were allegedly
misusing the double taxation treaty between India and Mauritius. Responding
to market rumours that a slide in the Sensex was generated by the notices
served on these FIIs, the Minister stepped in to allay "market fears"
that these FIIs would be scrutinised and made to pay the sums demanded,
if necessary.
Keeping the Sensex buoyant is obviously more crucial to Yashwant Sinha
than enforcing the laws of the land and trying to reverse the post-liberalisation
decline in the tax-GDP ratio at the Centre. Besides these, the Finance
Minister has provided a number of less obvious concessions, such as
a higher weighted deduction (of 150 as opposed to 125 per cent) for
Research and Development (R&D) expenses incurred in knowledge-based
industries. Experience shows that such concessions are exploited by
passing them off as R&D expenditure outlays on activities that would
not meet any acceptable definition of research. This transforms into
a concession a measure introduced as a means of promotion.
Add to this the fact that every possible existing or new firm is adding
on a 'tech', a 'dot' or a 'com' to its name in order to be identified
as belonging to the knowledge-based sectors, and that such firms were
the ones driving the speculative stock boom, which now appears headed
for collapse, these concessions too are at one remove aimed at propping
up the financial markets and providing incentives to finance capital.
And with these manoeuvres coming in the wake of a steep slide in the
Sensex, they are widely seen as having been formulated to cool market
nerves.
The government's focus on the markets does not stop here. In recent
years, monetary policy has also served to prop up the market, a tendency
which has been strengthened by the latest credit policy announced at
the end of April. There are three ways in which implicit support for
the market has been provided. First, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
has over the years increased the flexibility of the banking system to
enter new areas and undertake investments of a kind that help capital
market growth. The latest such "innovation" is the permission granted
to banks to enter the insurance sector, despite their not-too-satisfactory
performance in areas such as mutual funds and housing finance, which
they had been permitted to diversify into in recent years.
Second, through repeated reductions in the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR)
required of banks, amounting to an overall 7 percentage points, liquidity
in the system has been considerably enhanced, allowing market players
easy access to funds, not just for warranted but also speculative investments.
The recent credit policy has gone considerably further in enhancing
liquidity available to the market players. In his statement making the
announcement, RBI Governor Bimal Jalan promised to "maintain easy credit
and (institute) a cut in CRR if required and if the inflation rate is
down." Obviously, Jalan is concerned only about the likely inflation
in the prices of commodities, and is not too concerned about the huge
inflation in the prices of financial assets that had occurred before
the recent downturn in the stock markets began.
In fact, the direction of monetary policy is such that it appears geared
to supporting high asset prices. As one observer has put it: "The proposed
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) to provide crunch funds for market
players (and sometimes to drain the rushes), the reduction in the minimum
daily requirement of CRR balances by banks from 85 per cent to 65 per
cent, a special facility for securities settlement quite similar to
an intra-d ay credit facility, a Debt Securities Clearing Corporation
and the rest are all meant to keep the financial market amenable to
the RBI's intentions."
Finally, over the reform years, especially in the recent past, interest
paid on deposits with the banking system has been substantially reduced.
The maximum rate of interest has fallen by as much as 3 percentage points.
And to keep pace with this, the government has recently launched an
effort to reduce interest rates on small saving schemes. This fall in
interest rates serves to push small savers into mutual funds and debt
and equity instruments, which offer or are expected to offer higher
rates of return, helping to sustain demand in the market. The tax incentives
being provided on investments in specific financial assets such as infrastructure
bonds only further this tendency.
In sum, the combination of fiscal and monetary policies that are being
put in place appear to have been formulated with one eye on the market.
And inasmuch as the market has been passing through a speculative phase
resulting in unsustainable price-earnings ratios, this effort to prop
up the market amounts to support for speculative practices. The problem
is that speculative activity tends to drive the market both ways, with
the smaller investors rushing in when the market is buoyant and exiting,
having burnt their fingers badly, when the market is in free fall. This
exaggerates the movements of an index, which have been given undue significance
as a pointer to the health of the economy under the current regime.
Not surprisingly, the Finance Minister is not too comfortable with the
wild swings in the index. He expressed his resentment when he declared
in his reply to the budget debate: "The manner in which stock markets
are behaving leaves much to be desired. It is very silly behaviour."
What he left unsaid is that he himself has been silly enough to place
all his bets on those very same markets.
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