The
fragile foundations of the multilateral system underlined by the WTO have
been cruelly exposed in a recent decision by a dispute settlement panel
in a dispute involving the United States and the European Communities.
The Panel has held that the provisions of the United States Trade Act
(the Trade Act of 1974), which are designed to take unilateral action
against the country's trade partners do not in any way violate the commitments
taken by it under the WTO.
This
can be considered as one of the landmark rulings for it allows the United
States to use unilateral action against countries that are seen by the
US Administration to be undermining its trading interests, conveniently
by-passing the multilateral system. What makes the ruling of the Panel
more significant is fact that no less than 11 countries, which included
Japan, Canada, Korea, Brazil and India, joined in the dispute as third
parties to the dispute adding their weights to the complainant. It was
the combined strength of the arguments some of the more important players
in the WTO that thus fell by the way-side.
The
ruling of the Panel sets at rest all the speculation
that was rife in the five years that the WTO has been in existence that
the United States would find ways of providing legitimacy to the controversial
provisions of its Trade Act of 1974, viz. Sections 301 to 310, which provide
for unilateral action. This speculation was strengthened as a result of
two moves that the United States Trade Administration took in the post-WTO
phase. The first was a pre-emptive move that the Administration took in
1994 by enacting the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).
The URAA was intended to provide an assessment
of the future of the domestic legislations of the United States in a regime,
which was to be defined by the WTO rules. The second was the continued
use of Section 301 for identifying the countries that were seen as violating
the trading interests of the United States even when the WTO had emerged
as the organisation that was responsible for ensuring fair trade.
In respect of the Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 the URAA has the following comment: "The administration intends
to use Section 301 to pursue vigorously foreign unfair barriers that violate
U.S. rights or deny benefits to the United States under the Uruguay Round
Agreements". This comment should be seen in the context of the actions
that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) had been threatening
to use against countries in a more extensive manner since the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act was adopted in 1988.
The new Act added two new sections to Section
301, viz. Special and Super 301, aimed at focusing action that could now
be taken against the trading partners. While Special 301 was designed
to address violations in the area of intellectual property rights, Super
301 was to perform similar functions in the area of services. It needs
to be added here that Special and Super 301 gave the USTR the powers to
threaten action of trade retaliation in two of the key areas in the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Although no action of trade retaliation was taken
under the two provisions, the USTR used the powers available to it in
quite an effective manner. The countries most likely to face trade retaliation
were put under a "priority watch list" following which their
attitudes towards US business interests were closely scrutinised. In the
early years of USTR action under Special and Super 301, India was one
of the main targets for action.