In an
uncharacteristic move, India's conservative central bank has sought to
introduce significant changes in its monetary policy in its mid-year
review released on the 22nd of October. It has decided to slash
the cash reserve ratio from 7.5 to 5.5 per cent in two quick stages to
allow for the release of additional liquidity into the system. It has
reduced the Bank Rate, or the central banks' reference rate for interest
by half a percentage point.
The
motive behind these moves is all too clear. It is to try and trigger a
recovery in the economy, which is witnessing a downturn As has been noted
earlier in these columns, movements in the Index of Industrial Production,
the lead indicator of the growth performance of the Indian economy, point
to a significant slowdown in growth of the economy. The IIP for the
five-month period April-August 2001, increased by just 2.2 per cent
relative the corresponding period of the previous year, as compared with
the 5.6 per cent increase registered during the April-August period of
2000.
Thus even
before the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington,
India's economy has been experiencing a deceleration in growth. In fact,
the deceleration has been with us for some time now. According to the
quick estimates of quarterly GDP growth released by the CSO, the Indian
economy, which had been averaging a rate of growth of 6.0 per cent during
the four quarters between July 2000 and August 2001, experienced a decline
in growth rate to 5 and 3.8 per cent respectively over the subsequent two
quarters. The rate of growth stood at 4.4 per cent during the first
quarter (April-June) of 2001-02. Thus a longer-term tendency towards
deceleration has been visible for quite some time now.
This
deceleration comes at a time when there are virtually no supply-side
constraints on growth. In all areas, Indian industry is saddled with
unutilised capacity. There is no storage space left to accommodate the
government's foodstocks. And, foreign exchange reserves are at a
comfortable $45 billion, give government the flexibility to import any
tradable that is in short supply. This implies that growth is constrained
from the side of demand. Investment demand has remained sluggish for quite
some time now. And, industry experience with offtake and inventories
corroborate the secondary evidence that consumer demand, which was buoyant
during the high growth years 1994-95 and 1995-96, as well as in 1999-2000,
has slackened substantially.
Combine
these indicators of slack demand conditions with evidence that inflation
has been running at unusually low levels for quite some time now, and the
likelihood of the economy experience a deflationary collapse is more than
real. In fact, as the RBI itself notes annual inflation, as measured by
variations in Wholesale Price Index (WPI), stppd at 3.2 per cent on a
point-to-point basis, on October 6, 2001 as against 7.4 per cent a year
ago. Annual inflation, as measured by Consumer Price Index (CPI) for
industrial workers on a point-to-point basis, was 5.2 per cent in August
2001 as against 4.0 per cent a year ago.
Low
inflation combined with slow growth has forced the forced the central bank
to shift focus from its conventional objective of controlling the price
level, to a more pro-active one of stimulating growth. But the explanation
for the earnestness that the central bank has brought to bear on the task
of reviving growth lies elsewhere.
Historically, the task of triggering a recovery was assigned not to the
central bank but to the government itself. The principal instruments used
for the purpose were also fiscal rather than monetary. Enhanced State
spending, financed with new taxes or with borrowing from the central bank
or the open market was the means by which slack private demand that led to
slow growth was compensated for.
All that,
however, was true when Keynesian-type perspectives dominated
policy-making. But with the ascendance of supply-side economics in the
developed industrial countries, and its spread in the garb of IMF-style
"reform" to the developing countries, not only was slack demand seen as
less of a problem but intervention by the State through fiscal means in
the functioning of the economic mechanism was seen as distortionary and
inefficient. What is more, deficit-financed spending by the State, which
affected the functioning of the market for credit, was seen as the
principal economic problem in these countries. Not only was such
"autonomous" spending perceived to be the principal cause for crises
resulting from inflationary causes, but to the extent that it was financed
with borrowing from the central bank, it was seen as limiting the freedom
of the central bank to frame an appropriate monetary policy and use
monetary levers to influence the functioning of the economy.
The
influence of this "finance-driven" perspective has had two consequences in
India. First, it has resulted in an obsession with reducing and capping
the fiscal deficit at a time when liberalisation-related factors have
reduced the tax-GDP ratio, and therefore the amount of resources available
with the State to finance its expenditures. Second, it has resulted in the
fact that even to the extent that a deficit persists on the government's
budget, that deficit cannot be financed by borrowing from the central
bank, but has to be financed with borrowing from the open market. With
this intent, the Finance Ministry and the Reserve Bank of India had worked
out an implemented an agreement which prevents the government from
periodically issuing ad hoc treasury bills to finance a part of its
deficit.
With
hindsight it is clear that this agreement has substantially curtailed the
room for manoeuvre of the government to provide a fiscal stimulus to
revive economic growth in periods of slackening demand. With the size of
the deficit being controlled when the the tax-GDP ratio is falling, the
expenditure that the government can undertake is severely limited. And as
deficits are financed with high-interest open market loans as opposed to
the far cheaper loans that were available from the central bank in the
past, the share of the government's limited expenditure that was
pre-empted by interest payments tends to rise.