These protests have blunted the effort of US and other
developed-country governments to respond to rising oil prices with a
strategy of dividing OPEC and forcing it to increase supplies to an
extent where prices decline and risk setting themselves on a downward
trend that could take them once again to historic lows. Advocates of
that strategy were clearly against the alternatives to a return to a
situation where oil prices registered a free fall. Why should the US
Federal Reserve push up interest rates to hold back growth in an overheated
economy and in the process risk a sudden slowdown in US growth? Why
should European government lose revenues through cuts in fuel taxes
and reduce expenditures to meet deficit targets specified as part of
the effort at monetary union? These questions emanate from those who
believe that the appropriate response to the current situation consists
not of demand-side adjustments that slow growth in the developed countries,
but supply-side adjustments by OPEC members that risk a return to the
$10 a barrel era and slow growth in the OPEC-bloc. Needless to say,
these arguments emanate from precisely those countries which are at
the winning end of the current combination high growth and low inflation.
The explanation for this aggressive and divisive stance
is not difficult to find. It lies in the fear of a repeat of the scenario
of the 1970s and early 1980s, where oil price increases triggered a
recession. Those fears stem from the realisation that price stability
does not imply that high growth in the US in recent times had no inflationary
consequences. It was just that those consequences rather than being
reflected in higher prices had been visible in large and widening trade
deficits. The monthly trade deficit, or the difference between what
the US buys from and sells to the world, touched a record $31.9 billion
in July, up from $29.8 billion in June. This situation where every day
the US imports goods worth about a billion dollars has been the result
of a continuous widening of the size of the US trade deficit. Those
imports included a range of primary commodities whose prices were collapsing,
which contributed in no small way to low inflation in the US.
The rising trade deficit had not bothered either the
Fed or the US government because the US still serves as a safe haven
for capital from across the world. Investments in financial assets in
the US by investors abroad brought in enough money to finance the deficit,
allowing the US to continue to enjoy the benefit of high growth and
low inflation. But for those capital flows the dollar would have weakened
and forced the Federal reserve to raise interest rates and slow demand
growth. Those capital inflows also directly contributed to US growth.
By sustaining high stock values in the capital markets, they substantially
increased the wealth of US citizens, encouraging them to reduce their
savings and spend more from current incomes.
These are the factors which are being ignored when
analysts argue that technological change and efforts at conservation
are responsible for the fact that, unlike in 1974, 1980 and 1990, when
oil price increases led to recessions in the world economy, there are
no such signs at present. There are at least two ways in which oil prices
are threatening to adversely affect growth in the developed countries.
First, as mentioned earlier, higher oil prices, are worsening the already
large trade deficits on the US balance of payments, raising the possibility
of reduced confidence in the dollar, that could reduce capital flows,
set off a stockmarket decline and wipe out wealth with damaging consequences
for consumer confidence and spending. The principal stimulus to US and
thereby world economic growth in recent times can be foiled. Second,
higher oil prices can soon start influencing the rate of inflation in
the developed industrial economies, forcing their central banks to raise
interest rates and slow growth. This is already happening in Europe
where the European Central Bank has raised interest rates in response
to the rising headline inflation rate. In the US the Fed has been less
responsive, possibly partly because of the danger that an effort to
apply the brakes and ensure a "soft landing" onto a slower
growth path may spur a collapse in financial markets and of demand.
But at some point it would be forced to intervene.
With no immediate signs of a reversal of the upward
climb of oil prices, despite OPEC efforts to raise supplies and promises
by oil companies and governments to release part of their stocks, these
possibilities are threatening to realise themselves. If they do, the
story of oil price increases leading to recessions could be repeated
once again, with much greater severity given the fragile foundations
on which the US boom rests. It was this prospect which was defining
the mood at the Fund-Bank meetings at Prague, where even news of a persisting
boom could not clear the gloom.