According to one recent estimate (William Grieder
in the Nation, November 20, 2000) this means a frightening degree of
concentration sector by sector. Four firms control 82 percent of the
beef packing industry, 75 percent of delivery of hogs and sheep, and
half of chickens. Major supermarket chains are now concentrated regionally
within the US, though not nationally. Four firms hold 74 percent of
market control in ninety-four large cities; experts anticipate a new
merger wave that could swiftly increase that percentage while doubling
the four firms' overall national concentration up to 60 percent.
It
is not just that the "consumers" so beloved of mainstream
economic theory are adversely affected by these levels of concentration
and effective monopoly. It is also precisely this kind of market leverage
that has given the large companies a pricing advantage over farmers
and ranchers. And it is this which explains the rising spread between
the prices received by farmers
and livestock breeders, and the retail prices, that is so evident from
the charts.
Thus, companies regularly exploit this market leverage,
and the degree of control created by vertical integration of breathtaking
dimensions, to depress market prices for independent, relatively small
producers. In some cases the control is direct. Thus, owning feedlots,
or (an increasingly common practice) signing output contracts with
individual farmers for poultry, hogs, cattle and even grain and soyabean,
gives the processing companies access to their own captive supplies.
Even when there is no such
overt control, the ability of marketing giants to hold their own private
stores of livestock or grain or oilseeds means that they no longer have
to rely on the traditional auction based purchases in the open market
to provide most of their supply. This has affected the auction markets
as well, rendering the prices for farmers lower and more volatile.
The recent crashes in world trading prices have speeded
up these processes. Two consequences of this are now clear. One, is
that it drove many American farmers into rushing to accept whatever
new technology offered cost cutting or output increasing effects. Thus,
farmers sought more capital-intensive cultivation, and Monsanto and
other companies were also easily able to persuade farmers to adopt their
genetically modified seeds for corn and soyabean in particular. The
other impact of the price collapse is that it has driven many farmers
many more farmers into accepting the status of contract producer growing
crops of livestock under fixed-price contracts with the corporations.
This model is eerily reminiscent of the process of
forced commercialisation in Indian agriculture over the nineteenth century,
when small farmers were incorporated into a global economy through a
process of debt engagement or through contracts of purchase where the
ultimate buyer (say, for example, the opium or indigo planter) also
offered inputs such as seeds and other working capital and bound the
formerly independent producer into a subservient relationship.
Of course, in the US this process is occurring in
an already capitalist agriculture which is highly sophisticated in terms
of techniques and production organisation. For that reason, it also
bears similarity with the pattern of organisation in contemporary major
industrial sectors in developed economies. Here a large corporation
- say Nike or Benetton - organises a complex but disparate and shifting
network of affiliated producers, subcontractors and distributors, who
all adhere to its brand standards.
This entire process has been dramatically
described as follows :
"Farmers
can see themselves being reduced from their mythological status as independent
producers to a subservient and vulnerable role as sharecroppers or franchisees.
The control of food production, both livestock and crops, is being consolidated
not by the government but by a handful of giant corporations. While
farmers and ranchers suffered three years of severely depressed prices
at the close of the 1990s, the corporations enjoyed soaring profits
from the same line of goods. Growers are surrounded now on both sides
- facing concentrated market power not only from the companies that
buy their crops and animals but also from the firms that sell them essential
inputs like seeds and fertiliser. In the final act of unfettered capitalism,
the free market itself is destroyed." (William Grieder, "The
last farm crisis", The Nation, November 20, 2000)
American
farmers are effectively being incorporated
into a peculiar collectivisation of agriculture, where those in control
are large multinational companies operating all the way along the value
chain. And it is this model of growing corporatisation of agricultural
and agro-processed commodity production which is being upheld as an
example for other countries, and which is effectively being pushed on
to a whole range of developing countries such as India. In fact, the
current Indian government has already shown that it is very much in
favour of such a trend, and has provided further incentives to strengthen
such a process in the recent Annual Central Government Budget as well
as in the latest Exim Policy.
The effects of such a policy on American farmers,
who are already quite well off, and financially and politically strong,
are now apparent. But this process is likely to be much more devastating
in terms of its impact on Indian cultivators, a majority of whom are
already operating at the margin of subsistence.
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