There's
really no question about it: the world economy is heading for a period
of great economic uncertainty, in which instability, trade and currency
conflicts and possibilities of economic stagnation all loom large. This
reflects the absence of a global economic leader willing and able to
fulfil the roles identified by Charles Kindleberger: discounting in
crisis; countercyclical lending to countries affected by private investors'
decisions; and providing a market for net exports of the rest of the
world, especially those countries requiring it to repay debt. For obvious
reasons, the US cannot currently do these, and there is no evident alternative.
That is why co-ordination is so critical right now for international
capitalism, and why its absence will definitely be felt.
Governments
of both developed and developing countries seem to be caught between
the (often self-imposed) rock of fiscal consolidation created by the
hysteria of bond market vigilantes and the financial media, and the
hard place created by the unwillingness to give up what is clearly an
outdated growth model. As a result, we are faced with the worst of all
economic outcomes in terms of socially fraught stagnation in the North
and ecologically destructive and fragile expansion in the South, with
workers everywhere getting even worse off than before.
There are three major imbalances that continue to characterise the global
economy: the imbalance between finance and the real economy; the macroeconomic
imbalances between major economies; and the ecological imbalance created
by the pattern of economic growth. While these are obviously unsustainable,
the very process of their correction will necessarily have adverse effects
on current growth trajectories.
As it happens, the US current account deficit is already under correction:
the current account deficit in 2009 was just above half its 2008 level,
and the data for this year suggest that it will stay at around that
level. For the rest of the world, it does not really matter whether
the reduction occurs through currency movements or trade protectionism
or domestic economic contraction: the point is that some other engine
of growth has to be found.
Curiously, the governments of the major economies in the global system,
including G20, do not seem to have grasped this. The rather obvious
point that all countries cannot use net export growth as the route to
expansion does not seem to have been understood; so, all governments
think they can export their way out of trouble. This will have inevitable
implications for trade and currency wars, and the likelihood of global
economic stagnation.
So, how well is the Indian economy likely to cope in the near future,
and how will the population as a whole fare in these uncertain times?
There has been much celebration in the financial media in India about
how well we have weathered the Great Recession, and certainly the output
indicators (Chart 1) are impressive in the overall global context. Despite
poor agricultural performance, rates of growth of aggregate GDP have
remained high because of continued high growth in services and significantly
accelerated growth of industry (dominantly manufacturing).
However, the recent pattern of growth has in general been so heavily
skewed towards certain services that it has created an apparently unbalanced
economy (Chart 2). Agriculture and other primary activities account
for less than 15 per cent of GDP, even though they continue to employ
well over half the workforce in what is obviously mostly low-productivity
activity. Manufacturing has remained stable, and relatively small in
output and even smaller in employment. However, the newer services that
now dominate the GDP do not employ too many people either, so that most
other workers are engaged in low remuneration services. Meanwhile, the
FIRE sector (finance, insurance, real estate, and business services)
has been growing rapidly and now accounts for an even higher share of
GDP than manufacturing – a sure sign of a bubble economy.
So
this means that we are back to the same unsustainable pattern of growth
that generated the images of ''India shining'': booms in retail credit
sparked by financial deregulation and enabled by capital inflows. These
have been combined, especially in the wake of the global crisis, with
fiscal concessions to spur consumption among the richest sections of
the population. This has generated a substantial rise in profit shares
in the economy and the proliferation of financial activities, and combined
with rising asset values to enable a continuation of the credit-financed
consumption splurge among the rich and the middle classes along with
debt-financed housing investment.
The problem is that this is associated with a balance of payments trajectory
that is fundamentally unsustainable. As Chart 3 shows, it is only the
invisibles account (led by remittances from India workers abroad and
software and related exports) that has kept the balance of payments
from appearing to be even more stark. The trade account shows ever growing
deficits, which are increasingly driven by non-oil imports. Meanwhile,
the large inflows of capital are really being stored up in the form
of foreign exchange reserves, for fear of causing excessive exchange
rate appreciation.
In
fact, after a brief period of reduction, India's place as a currently
favoured destination for internationally mobile capital was reinforced
in the past year. Chart 4 shows how different elements of the captial
account have behaved in recent years. The most rapid post-crisis recovery
has been in portfolio capital, which fell during the crisis year but
surged back to high levels the subsequent year. In fact, the most recent
data (not covered in this chart) indicates a troublesome surge in such
hot money inflows, of more than $70 billion in just a few months – troublesome
because it can lead to an unwanted currency appreciation and because
it can just as easily flow out again.
This
is a problem plaguing several emerging economies, and underlines the
need for capital controls to prevent unwanted inflows of speculative
capital. So much so that even the IMF has started advocating such controls
for developing countries that are being swamped by the ''carry trade''
based on interest rate differentials across economies.
Unfortunately,
our own government seems much less consious of the dangers such inflows
pose, especially for an economy that is clearly in the midst of another
bubble-driven expansion. Instead, Ministers are talking about the economy
being able to absorb at least another $100 billion of capital inflows
– unmindful of the reality that the economy has not even absorbed the
smaller amounts that are currently pouring in, and instead is simply
accumulating reserves.
In
any case, such absorption has to be sustainable, which is why much more
attention is required to improving the trade account. This is going
to be much more difficult in the current global economy, but clearly
the need is for both diversification of trade and more attention to
sustainable expansion of the domestic market.
The good news is that on the external trade front there does seem to
have been a significant process of diversification in the past decade,
as Charts 5 and 6 indicate. China is among our largest trading partners
now, though that dominantly consists of India exporting raw materials
and intermediates and importing finished goods from China. The Middle
East has also emerged as a major market, and other areas are playing
increasing roles as well.
However,
without sustained expansion of the domestic market, the condition of
the bulk of the Indian population will not improve. This really requires
increasing the disposable incomes of wage earners and the self-employed,
not just a credit-based expansion of demand that is bound to end in
tears. But for this, there has to be more official focus on generating
both employment and better remuneration. This is actually quite doable,
since it can be led by increased public provision of essential goods
and services (all of which are employment generating and have high multiplier
effects). But for that, we need genuine political will.