Through the 1990s, consecutive governments at the Centre have
advocated the sale of public sector equity as a means of public sector
'reform'. Equity sale, the industry policy statement of July 1991 argued,
was a means of ensuring financial discipline and improving performance.
The fact that there is little theoretical justification for or empirical
validation of this position has of course been ignored. The immediate
reason is fiscal convenience. Having internalised the IMF prescription
that reducing or doing away with fiscal deficits is the prime indicator of
good macroeconomic management, the government has found privatisation
proceeds to be a useful source of revenues to window dress budgets. To
boot, such window dressing could be defended on the grounds that
privatisation was taking the economy in a market friendly direction.
This has meant that, while there has been much talk of managerial
reform, voluntary retrenchment and greater public sector autonomy, the
thrust of public sector reform has been the sale of equity. In the event,
the target for disinvestment has been increasing. It was placed at Rs.
2,500 crore in 1991-92, Rs. 3,500 crore in 1992-93 and 1993-94, Rs. 4,000
crore in 1994-95, Rs. 7,000 crore in 1995-96, Rs. 5,000 crore in 1996-97,
Rs. 4,800 crore in 1997-98, Rs. 5,000 crore in 1998-99 and an ambitious
Rs. 10,000 crore in 1999-2000.
Over these years, the nature of the privatisation has also changed.
Initially the emphasis was on divestment of a part of equity, with the
controlling block still being with the government. Since shares of
different public sector units (PSUs) would be valued differently by the
market because of variations in performance, shares were offered only in
"bundles" which combined equity from poor and good performers. In
practice, rather than help the government divest shares in loss-making
enterprises at reasonable prices, bundling resulted in the government
obtaining an extremely low average price for each bundle, implying that
prime shares where being handed over at rock-bottom prices. Thus, in
1991-92, when the bundling option was resorted to, the average price at
which more than 87 crore shares were sold stood at Rs. 34.83, as compared
with the average price of Rs. 109.61 realised since then (Table 2). While
the growing tendency to sell equity in the best PSUs partially accounts
for this difference, it was also due to the low prices obtained for even
premium shares in that year. As Table 1 shows, MTNL, ITI, VSNL, CMC and
Cochin Refineries were some of the firms in which the government's equity
was divested that year.
With the experience of 'bundling' proving to be disastrous from a
price (and revenue) point of view, the government soon began talking of
the need for privatisation, as opposed to just disinvestment. It was
argued, by a committee headed by former RBI Governor C. Rangarajan, that
equity sales could be of magnitudes that brought the government's stake
below 50 per cent and even as low as 25 per cent in some cases. This, it
was held, was not merely in keeping with the objective of the State
withdrawing from non-core and non-strategic areas, but also provided a
greater incentive to the private sector to acquire public sector equity.
More recently, after the constitution of the now dissolved Disinvestment
Commisssion in 1996, the government has gone further and advocated
'strategic sales' of particular PSUs, or sales of equity blocks to a
single buyer accompanied by the transfer of management to the private
investor. What is amazing is that in some cases such as IPCL, a highly
successful and profitable PSU, the transfer of management has been
recommended to any private party which acquires a 25 per cent in the
company.
The willingness to hand over control through strategic sales has
resulted in allegations of complicity between sections of the government
and particular domestic or international business groups such as Reliance
industries in the case of IPCL. Such allegations are also buttressed by
the fact that if Reliance does manage to acquire control of IPCL, it would
have a virtual monopoly over certain segments of the market for
hydrocarbons. But setting aside such allegations, it is clear that the
longer the government persists with its privatisation agenda, the greater
are the concessions it has to make to private sector buyers of government
equity.
These concessions are of three kinds. First, lower prices. While
the first issue of global depository receipts (GDRs) by VSNL in March 1997
was prices at $13.93 and was oversubscribed 10 times, the GDR issue in
February 1999 was priced at $9.25. Not only was the February price much
lower than the March 1997 price, but it amounted to a discount of 12 per
cent relative to the 10-day average price of VSNL GDRs on the London Stock
Exchange at that time.
More recently, there has been much controversy surrounding the sale
of 18 per cent equity in GAIL (acquired mainly by GAIL's potential
competitors Enron and British Gas) at Rs. 70 per share, when the ruling
market price was Rs. 79.80. While the government raised Rs. 1,095 crore
through the disinvestment of 155 million shares represented by 22.5
million GDRs, it has at the minimum suffered a loss of Rs. 145 crore,
besides giving GAIL's international competitors an initial stake which can
be built up into a voice in the management of the company. However, it is
not just the discount relative to prevailing market prices that reflects
the low prices at which prime public assets are being sold. Even market
prices most often do not reflect the real worth of the assets of many of
these companies and definitely not the true value of these assets for some
of the companies acquiring them.
The second concession the government has had to make is that it
increasingly has to put the best assets of the public sector up for sale.
Charts and 3 and 4 detail the percentage of shares disinvested by the
government between July 1991 and March 1997 and the total extent of sale
of the government's shareholding in these companies as on
March 31, 1997. What is clear is that much of the
disinvestment has indeed occurred during the years of reform and that
among the companies in which a third or more of equity had been divested
even by 1997 March were successful public sector giants like VSNL, Bharat
Petroleum, IPCL, HOCL and Hindustran Petroleum. Even including the less
profitable PSUs in which government equity has been divested, the average
rate of return (gross profit to total capital employed) during 1994-95 to
1996-97 in companies subjected to privatisation stood, at 22.2 per cent,
well above the average of 14.93 per cent for the public sector as a whole
(Chart 5).
Finally, the third concession which the government has had to
increasingly offer for pushing ahead with privatisation is a willingness
to provide management control to "strategic investors" from the private
sector, even in instances where the investor concerned does not hold a
majority of shares.
Unfortunately for the government, despite these concessions, equity
sale has not proved an easy task. As Chart 1 shows, there have been only
three years (1991-92, 1994-95 and 1998-99) in which proceeds from
divestment in the budget have been of consequence. The government's
"success" in these three years was however attributable to widely
divergent reasons. In 1991-92, success was due to the decision to accept
extremely low bids for share "bundles" which included equity from public
sector units which would have otherwise commanded a handsome premium. In
1994-95, success can be traced to the willingness to offload a significant
chunk of shares in attractive targets like BHEL (11.74 per cent), Bharat
Petroleum (3.42 per cent), Container Corporation (20 per cent), Engineers
India (5.99 per cent), GAIL (3.37 per cent), Hindustan Organic Chemicals
(23.1 per cent), Hindustan Petroleum (9.47 per cent), ITDC (10 per cent)
and MTNL (12.82 per cent) (See Table 1).
Finally, the experience in 1998-99 when the government exceeded its
disinvestment target by a wide margin, was in substantial part the result
of the decision to get cash-rich PSUs to "cross-hold" shares in related
PSUs by buying the same off the government. Of the Rs. 9,000 crore
garnered in 1998/99, only Rs. 1195.25 crore were raised through market
disinvestment in Concor (Rs. 225 crores), GAIL (Rs. 184 crore) and VSNL
(Rs. 786.25 crore). Much of the rest came from cross-holding investments
by the oil PSUs, ONGC, GAIL and IOC. Cash rich public sector corporations
were forced to buy-back the government's holding of their equity or the
equity of other public sector enterprises. This amounted to forcing PSUs,
that need resources to allow for restructuring in order to face up to the
more liberal and competitive environment, instead to hand over their
investible surpluses to finance the fiscal deficit of the government. As
Chart 2 shows, in all three years in which disinvestment proceeds have
been significant, they helped finance around 8 per cent of the fiscal
deficit that would have shown up in the budget but for privatisation.
The 1999-2000 budget had provided for these sale proceeds to
finance as much as 10 per cent of the projected deficit without
privatisation. With just 3 months to go, the government has managed to
raise just about Rs. 1,500 crore of the budgeted Rs. 10,000 crore, much of
which has been garnered by the distress sale of GAIL shares. While factors
like the elections did tie the government's hands a bit, the main reason
for this year's failure on the disinvestment front is the unwillingness of
private buyers to offer the government a reasonable price for its shares.
The government had, in fact, to defer the launch of its plan to sell an
additional 19 million shares, which was expected to yield $100 million
because of the low prices that were on offer in the market.
Faced with this situation the government appears to be resorting to
two options, First, to use a revised version of the cross-holding route.
Power Minister Rangarajan Kumaramangalam recently created a stir by
announcing the government's 'decision' to transfer its shareholding in the
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), which reportedly survives
on a budgetary handout of Rs. 450 crore every financial year, to the
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), for a princely sum of Rs. 4,500
crore.
Among the reasons
for the transaction, the Minister clearly declared, was the effort to
garner the resources needed to meet the target of Rs. 10,000 crore from
privatisation set in the budget. Virtually pre-empting the question as to
where the NTPC itself was to find the money to pay the government,
Kumaramangalam's statement described a structured process in which the
NTPC would hive off a few of its units into a new subsidiary.
Subsequently, 51 per cent of NTPC's holding in the subsidiary would be
offloaded to the private sector. That strategic sale was expected to yield
the resources to pay the government Rs. 2,500 crore this financial year
and Rs. 2,000 crore in the next financial year.
Even to those initiated in the intricacies of the ideology of
privatisation, the proposal sounded peculiar. Clearly what was being
privatised at the end of this process was not the NHPC but a segment of
the NTPC. If that be the case, the government could have chosen to offload
a part of its shareholding in the latter corporation to directly obtain
the Rs. 4,500 crore, so that a truncated NTPC is not left burdened with
NHPC's less profitable assets.
This suggests that the government is seeking to achieve two
objectives at one go. The first, to use the words of Finance Minister
Yashwant Sinha, is to treat the NTPC as a "big ticket item", which could
immediately yield large revenues from equity sale to solve the problem of
this year's burgeoning fiscal deficit. The second is to transfer that
money to the government through the devious route of NHPC acquisition so
that the returns on the assets remaining with the NTPC could cover the
deficit in the NHPC's accounts and reduce the government's future
budgetary burden.
Needless to say this amounts to a strategy of virtually killing one
of the "Navratnas" in the public sector, to meet the immediate "revenue"
needs of a cash-strapped government. It is virtually forcing one of the
better performers in the public sector to resort to a strategic sale of
some of its best assets in order buy up poorly performing public sector
units. This would only render the public sector even more of a burden on
the exchequer.
In fact, it has been reported that as a quid pro quo for the NHPC
buy-out deal, the government has promised to cap dividend payments by the
NTPC as well as leave the Navratna status of the corporation untouched
even if it contracts debts that have to be guaranteed by the government,
such as multilateral loans. That debt is seen as an important way of
keeping the NTPC afloat is reflected in Kumaramangalam's statement that
the buy-out of NHPC by increasing the asset base of the corporation would
increase its leverage in the financial market. Put simply, the strategy
appears to be one of reducing the fiscal deficit in the central budget by
substituting government debt with public sector debt.
Secondly, given the cash-crunch the devious buy-back and equity
cross-holding schemes are to continue. According to reports, the
government is expecting to garner Rs. 500 crore from a buy-back of
government equity by the Rural Electrification Corporation and the Power
Finance Corporation. This would imply that in the long run, the returns
which the government gets in the form of dividends from profitable public
enterprises would fall, while its commitment to cover the losses of
loss-making public enterprises would remain, worsening thereby the fiscal
situation.
Finally, the distress sale of equity in leading PSUs like MTNL,
VSNL and IPCL cannot be ruled out. If the divestment of large chunks of
equity is to be persisted with, the prices of these otherwise valuable
assets are bound to fall. And all indications are that the government is
firmly set to move in this direction. The final loss may be borne not only
by the citizens who ultimately finance the government's budget through
their direct and indirect tax payments, but also by consumers who may have
to deal with private monopolies in critical areas of domestic economic
activity.
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