The principal reason behind Japan succumbing to this pressure was its
dependence on world, especially US, markets to sustain growth. When faced
with US opposition to protectionism against Japanese imports, Japanese
investors sought to Americanize themselves by acquiring or establishing
new production capacity in the US in areas like automobiles. In return for
the 'freedom' to export to and invest in the US, Japan had to make some
concessions. But the demands made by the US proved to be quite damaging.
It began by requiring Japan to reverse the depreciation of its currency.
Following the celebrated Plaza Accord, arrived at in New York
in September 1985, the Japanese yen, which had started to appreciate
against the US dollar in February 1985 from a 260 yen-to-the-dollar level,
maintained its upward trend to touch 123 yen-to-the-dollar in November
1988. Though the following year saw movements that signalled a
strengthening of the dollar relative to the yen, the downturn soon began,
resulting in a collapse of the dollar once again from an end-1989 value of
143.45 yen to its April1995 level of below 80. Any economy faced with such
a huge appreciation of its currency was bound to stall, more so an
export-dependent one like the Japanese one.
This trend, which resulted in the hollowing out of Japanese industry,
undermined the principal area of business of the banks as well, which were
faced with the prospect that some of their past lending could turn
non-performing. It was in response to this that the Japanese banks joined
the chorus against financial controls, demanding that they be permitted to
diversify away from their traditional areas. The government responded by
effecting regulatory changes in the form of a revision of the Foreign
Exchange Control Law in 1980 and granting permission to commercial banks
to create non-bank subsidiaries (jusen) to lend against real estate
investments. Besides expanding overseas operations, the main areas into
which the banks diversified were lending against real estate and stock
market investments. The rate of growth of real estate lending rose from 7
per cent in the second half of the 1970s to 18 per cent in the first half
and 20 per cent in the second half of the 1980s.
The
result was a speculative boom triggered by a mad rush into the new areas.
Even as GDP growth was slower in the 1980s as compared to the 1950s and
1960s, the six-largest-cities-index of real estate prices tripled between
end-March 1985 and end-March 1990, from 33.6 to 100
(Chart 6). Similarly
as Chart 7 shows
, there was
a massive speculative boom in stock markets, with the yearly high of the
Nikkei stock market index rising from 12,500 in 1985 to 38,916 in 1989. By
1989 it was clear that the asset bubble was bound to burst, and in a
belated effort to halt the frenzy and respond to householder complaints
that acquiring housing was virtually impossible, the Japanese government
stepped in by controlling credit and raising interest rates. The net
result was a collapse in both real estate and stock markets. The real
estate index fell to half its peak level by 1995 and to a third by 2001.
And the Nikkei, which registered a high of 38,713 on 4 January 1990, fell
soon after to an intra-year low of just above 20,000, continuing its
downward slide thereafter right up to 1998. A slight recovery in 1999 was
followed by a further fall in 2000.
Chart
6 >> Chart 7 >>
As a consequence of this collapse and prolonged decline there was a huge
build-up of bad debt with the banking system. At the beginning of 2002,
the official estimate of non-performing loans of Japanese banks stood at
Yen43 trillion, or 8 per cent of GDP. This, despite the fact that over
nine years ending March 2001, Japanese banks had written off Yen 72
trillion in bad loans. There is still a lot of scepticism about official
estimates of the extent of bad debts. In September 1997 the Ministry of
Finance announced that the banking sector held Yen 28 trillion in
non-performing loans, but soon after that, using a 'broader definition',
it arrived at a figure of Yen 77 trillion, which amounted to 11 per cent
of outstanding private bank loans in Japan and 16 per cent of its GDP. And
in 1998 the Financial Supervisory Agency placed problem debt at Yen 87.5
trillion and debt already declared bad at Yen 35.2 trillion, which added
up to a total of Yen 123 million. Whatever the figure, in the past this
would not have been a problem, as it would have been met by an infusion of
government funds in various ways into the banking system. But under the
new liberalized, market-based discipline, banks (i) are not getting
additional money to finance new NPAs; (ii) are being required to pay back
past loans provided by the government; and (iii) are faced with the
prospect of a reduction in depositor guarantees, which could see the
withdrawal of deposits from them.