This becomes even more clear from Chart 3, which shows annual compound rates of growth of exports in dollar values for the major product groups, over the two halves of the decade. Note that this division also marks the period before and after the formation of the World Trade Organisation, which was supposed to lead to a rapid and exponential expansion in world trade. In all the major commodity groups except mining (for which the increase in export value growth is almost entirely the result of rising oil prices) rates of growth of exports in world markets have fallen, and for agricultural exports they have turned negative.
Chart 3 >>
  
Obviously, the promise of rapid trade expansion consequent upon the signing of the Uruguay Round GATT agreement has thus far turned out to be a false one. A basic reason for this has indeed been because the expectations of increased market access for developing countries have not been met. In the areas where developing countries expected the most gains – tropical agricultural products and textiles and ready made garments, market access conditions for developing countries have worsened.
 
And this has happened completely within the legal provisions of the GATT Agreement. This tends to confirm the point made by critics at the time, that these agreements themselves were flawed and unequal, drawn up in forms which were inimical to the interests of developing countries as well as workers and consumers in developed countries.
 
The combination of stagnant or reduced market access and increased export dependence of many developing countries has meant that many developing countries have had to respond to this by trying even harder to push out exports, at lower prices if necessary. In fact this downward pressure on many export prices has been evident even in developed countries, and in both primary and manufactured goods.
 
Chart 4 describes the movement of unit values of exports over the 1990s. It shows how, other than for oil, unit export values have declined continuously from the rather low peak of 1995. For agricultural exports, which have been the hardest hit, unit values of exports have fallen by nearly 20 per cent just in the five year period between 1995 and 2000. Even for manufactured goods, unit values have fallen by 17 per cent over the same five year period. These translate into very sharp annual average declines of nearly 5 per cent and 4 per cent respectively, as Chart 5 indicates.
Chart 4 >> Chart 5 >>
 
These world trade price declines are especially evident in the case of primary commodities other than oil. Chart 6 shows how prices of raw and processed food have fallen over the 1990s, and Chart 7 makes it clear that minerals and metals other than petroleum have also faced stagnant or falling prices. Incidentally, as can be seen from Chart 8, even crude petroleum prices have only risen significantly in the last two years of the decade, and that has created the impression of buoyant prices in this category.
Chart 6>> Chart 7 >>  Chart 8 >>
 
The interesting point that emerges from the Charts 9 a, b, and c is that in the two decades since 1980, the share of developing countries in world trade has not increased, which is quite contrary to general position. Even in the decade 1980-1990, which was the period of rapid expansion of manufacturing exports from the East Asian economies and other newly industrialising nations, the overall share of developing countries in total world exports fell quite sharply, largely because of the decline in primary exports in value terms. The subsequent recovery in share over the 1990s in turn can be traced once again to primary exports – essentially the rise in oil prices – rather than manufactured goods exports as such.
Chart 9a >> Chart 9b >> Chart 9c>>
 
The point in all this is of course that that the expectations about greater access to developed country markets, or about trade deregulation leading to much expanded volumes of trading activity and greater prosperity for developing country exporters as well, have proved to be false thus far. It is misleading to argue that all these benefits would become evident only by 2005 : the point is that the GATT Agreement was supposed to have unleashed dynamic processes which would already have made themselves felt through more buoyant trade, but in fact the opposite has occurred.
 
It is in this context that developing countries’ demands for review and implementation of the existing treaties must be seen. The point is that developing countries have not received trade benefits which would have made it worth their while to give up so much in terms of the adverse consequences of the TRIPS agreement, their own import liberalisation which has affected domestic output and employment, and loss of sovereignty in other decision making. And therefore the calls for review of the agreements, their implications and implementation, followed by possible renegotiation of these agreements, are perfectly legitimate demands.