The
industrial slowdown is now accepted as fact by most policy makers and
observers of the Indian economy. Yet officials and commentators seem to
blame it on external factors: most obviously, the global financial crisis
originating in the US economy, the consequent economic slowdown and now
recession in the US, the European Union and other developed country markets,
and the associated impact upon exports.
It is certainly true that the bad news from abroad – which shows no signs
of easing up – has impacted upon domestic stock markets, investor expectations,
and the exporting industries in particular. But it is also unfortunately
the case that our own economy has been showing several causes for concern
even before that external bad news started pouring in. There was the accelerating
inflation, which particularly hit food and other items of essential consumption,
and recently exacerbated by the increase in petrol prices. In addition
there have been signs of decelerating growth, especially in industrial
activity, and these cannot be ascribed only to reduced export orders,
but are more likely to have domestic causes.
Consider the index of industrial production, presented in Chart 1 (with
base year 1993-94). The general index peaked in March this year, fell
quite sharply thereafter and subsequently has been more or less flat at
the lower level. This pattern essentially reflects the behaviour of the
manufacturing index, which accounts for around 80 per cent of the weight
of the general index. Such a pattern tends to be obscured by the standard
way of presenting the industrial growth data, in terms of year-on-year
monthly rates.
What
is especially disconcerting is the evidence on electricity production,
which shows hardly any increase at all but simply fluctuations around
a flat trend for the past 18 months. Since electricity still remains substantially
undersupplied, and its shortage can create supply bottlenecks for other
production, this stagnation is worth noting.
The use-based classification industrial production suggests that the slowdown
in growth is spread across several important sectors. Chart 2 provides
the evidence on recent trends in production in the basic, capital goods
and intermediate industries. Once again, both basic goods and intermediate
goods, which have strong backward and forward linkages with other industrial
activity, have been stagnant and hardly increased at all over the past
one and half years. The production of capital goods shows much greater
volatility, with a sharp increase in March 2008 but decline thereafter
from that peak.
Consumer
goods are the most likely - and the first - to be directly affected by
slowing demand in domestic and export markets. Chart 3 show that this
too is not a recent problem, but one which has been clearly evident in
the economy at least since the beginning of the current calendar year.
The production of consumer non-durable goods, which account for the bulk
of consumer goods (with more than 80 per cent weight) peaked in January
2008 and have fallen continuously since then. Consumer durables, onthe
other hand, had benefited from a credit-financed boom that had elements
of unsustainability that are eerily similar to the US credit-driven consumption
boom. The significant expansion of retail credit, especially credit card
debt and hire purchase schemes, had generated demand for consumer durables
and automobiles, but such credit-driven expansion became increasingly
problematic as interest rates increased and lenders became more concerned
with the viability of this rapidly growing consumer debt.
Table 1: Year-On-Year
Growth of IIP for Particular Sectors (per cent) |
|
September
2008 |
Apr-Sep
2008 |
Food Products |
5.2 |
-1.4 |
Beverages, Tobacco and Related Products |
11.7 |
23.3 |
Cotton Textiles |
-9.3 |
-0.5 |
Wool, Silk and man-made fibre textiles |
1.4 |
-0.2 |
Jute and other vegetable fibre Textiles (except cotton) |
-0.4 |
-5.5 |
Textile Products (including Wearing Apparel) |
-1.9 |
3.8 |
Wood and Wood Products; Furniture and Fixtures |
-9.7 |
-10.4 |
Paper & Paper Products and Printing, Publishing
& Allied Industries |
8.3 |
3 |
Leather and Leather & Fur Products |
-8.6 |
-0.3 |
Basic Chemicals & Chemical Products (except products
of Petroleum & Coal) |
-3.6 |
6.1 |
Rubber, Plastic, Petroleum and Coal Products |
-3.4 |
-4.2 |
Non-Metallic Mineral Products |
-0.6 |
0.6 |
Basic Metal and Alloy Industries |
5.6 |
6.2 |
Metal Products and Parts, except Machinery and Equipment |
12.8 |
1.3 |
Machinery and Equipment other than Transport equipment |
16.1 |
9.8 |
Transport Equipment and Parts |
16.8 |
12.8 |
Other Manufacturing Industries |
10.5 |
-1.1 |
Table
1 show that this deceleration was widely spread across different manufacturing
sectors. Indeed, only the chemicals, machinery and transport equipment
sectors appear to still be growing, albeit at slower rates.
What explains this trend of deceleration even before the outbreak of global
financial crisis? One partial explanation can be found in Chart 4, which
shows the movement of imports and exports over the same period. It is
evident that exports have been growing throughout this period, and so
a fall in aggregate export demand cannot yet be blamed for the domestic
inudstrial deceleration, although it may indeed have an adverse impact
soon. But the explosion in imports is also worth noting, and that suggests
that import competition could have affected domestic production of many
manufactured goods.
The
rapidly growing import bill is only partly a result of the high oil prices
that prevailed over most of 2007 and the early part of 2008. Non-oil imports
also increased, aided not only by more liberalised trade but also by the
appreciation of the rupee in 2007.
Table 2 shows that non-oil imports for the period April-May 2008 compared
to the same period in 2007, increased by nearly a quarter. Within that,
certain sectors showed very high rates of increase in import values, much
more than the growth of domestic production, suggesting some amount of
imports penetration in a wide range of manufacturing sectors.
Table 2: Increase in Import Values (in Rs. crore)
Y ear-On-Year for April-May 2008 (per cent)
|
Total
Imports |
38.51 |
POL
imports |
73.61 |
Non-oil
imports |
23.51 |
Textile
products, incl garments |
19.28 |
Chemical
products |
56.53 |
Med
& pharma products |
37.77 |
Artificial
resins & plastics |
47.85 |
Metal
goods |
89.44 |
Machine
tools |
83.41 |
Non-elec
machinery |
47.54 |
Elec
machinery |
58.02 |
Electronic
machinery |
19.65 |
Transport
equipment |
25.62 |
Professional
equipment |
57.05 |
Other
miscellaneous imports |
28.95 |
Source:
DGCI&S |
This in turn suggests that the deceleration of industry may have resulted
from the inability of the government to ensure the macro management of
the economy in a complex global situation. The rush of foreign capital
into India was acutally sought by the government, whether in the form
of (subsequently fickle) portfolio investments or by encouraging Indian
corporates take on more external commercial loans. This inflow led to
upward pressure on the rupee, and this combined with trade liberalisation
to encourage more import penetration. Some of this must definitely have
damaged activity and employment among Indian producers, especially the
small scale producers who still account for around one-third of manufacturing
GDP and much more than two-thirds of manufacturing employment.
Then, the global rise in food and fuel prices was allowed to impact upon
prices in India. In response to this, instead of managing these specific
items, the government raised interest rates as an anti-inflationary measure.
This had the effect of further damaging the prospects for industrial activity.
All this happened before the subsequent outflows of captial led to a rapidly
depreciating rupee – but by then the damage had been done.
It is pointless to blame external forces, because none of these processes
was necessary within India. There was no need to encourage and then suffer
the effects of mobile capital flows that brought in resources that were
not even going to be used. Instead, capital inflows could simply have
been controlled to prevent upward pressure on the exchange rate. Inflation
could have been managed by first recognising the essentially speculative
and therefore temporary nature of the global fuel and food price rises,
and then addressing the specific management of these sectors within the
economy.
Unfortunately this previous mismanagement has worse consequences than
simply the evident industrial deceleration. It has also weakened the economy
even before it faces the full impact of the global recession and the financial
turmoil. |