As
India's government gloats over its US-brokered entry into the world's
nuclear club, it may be sobering to examine the implications of some information
collated in the recently released biennial Science and Engineering Indicators
report of the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the US. Concerned with
the evidence of a growing erosion of US dominance in high technology areas,
these reports have in recent years paid considerable attention to emerging
trends in high technology production and commerce. An important issue
here is the change in the geography of high-technology manufacturing,
with new producers growing rapidly and establishing a presence in global
production and trade. The NSF adopts the OECD’s classification in this
regard and includes the following sectors in the high technology category:
(i) Aerospace, (ii) Pharmaceuticals, (iii) Office and computing machinery,
(iv) Radio, television and communications equipment, and (v) Medical,
precision and optical instruments.
If in the past US attention used to be directed at Japan as an emerging
competitor, more recently China and India have been under the scanner.
When it comes to hi-tech manufacturing, the focus on China is indeed warranted.
But, India, which attracts disproportionate attention because of its success
as an exporter of software and IT-enabled services and its recent high
rate of growth, has lagged far behind. Thus, if we take the 20-year period
from 1985 to 2005, the share of China’s hi-tech manufacturing industries
in global value added in the high technology sectors, which rose slowly
from 1.53 per cent to 3.15 per cent over the decade 1985 to 1995, subsequently
shot up to 16.06 per cent by 2005 (Chart 1). On the other hand, over the
20-year period as a whole India’s share in global high technology manufacturing
value added increased from a negligible 0.12 per cent to an almost equivalent
and insignificant 0.43 per cent. Interestingly, the US which had seen
a substantial decline in its share of global value added in hi-tech areas
between 1985 and 1995, managed to reverse this tendency during the second
half of the 1990s, largely as a result of an expansion of the radio, television
and communications sector and partly because of advances in Office and
computing machinery. Thus China’s gain was at the expense of the EU and
the rest of the world outside the US.
The remarkable performance of China is also reflected in the relative
share of the high technology sectors in its manufacturing sector as a
whole. Chart2 compares the relative share of value added in the hi-tech
sectors in aggregate manufacturing value added in a number of countries.
Across the world that share rose from 11.66 per cent in 1985 to 19.08
per cent in 2005. The EU’s performance tracked this trend well, with the
relevant share rising in its case from 9.66 to 14.26 per cent. The US
performed better, with the share in its case rising from 13.7 to 24.2
per cent. India’s performance, however, is unimpressive. While the share
in India doubled from 4.3 to 8.6 per cent, the absolute value of that
share was much less than the global average. On the other hand China’s
performance was remarkable, with the hi-tech share in its case rising
from 8.4 to 29.4 per cent of manufacturing value added over this 20 year
period.
As is to be expected and been noted often, given its per capita income,
China's rise in the global league tables for hi-tech manufacturing was
the result of a rapid expansion of exports. The ratio of export sales
to revenues rose from 25 per cent in 1985 to more than 75 per cent in
the mid-1990s, only to moderate later as domestic consumption of high
technology products rose along with incomes. By 2005 that ratio had fallen
below 60 per cent (Chart 3), because of a rise in domestic consumption
and not because of a decline in exports..
China's
success on the export front has meant that its presence in global hi-tech
trade is even greater than in production, with its share in global hi-tech
manufacturing exports having risen from a little more than 2.5 per cent
in 1985 to close to 20 per cent in 2005 (Chart 4). This rise paralleled
a decline in the shares of both the US and the EU in global trade in
these products. On the other hand, India has been and remains a non-existent
player in global markets for high technology manufacturing.
What
is of interest is the structure of the hi-tech manufacturing sectors in
these countries. In the case of China the sector was completely dominated
by the Radio, television and communications equipment sector in the mid-1980s,
when it accounted for almost two-thirds of all hi-tech manufacturing value
added (Chart 5). Since then the production of Office and computing machinery
has been rising rapidly so that by 2005 it accounted for 39 per cent of
hi-tech value added, while that of Radio, television and communications
equipment had fallen to 43 per cent. In sum, information technology hardware
is central to China’s hi-tech success. On the other hand, though India
is considered an information technology power, these two information technology
sectors, which accounted for around 20 per cent of hi-tech value added
in 1985, contributed just about 12 per cent of that value added in 2005
(Chart 6).
Interestingly, the industries that have come to dominate the hi-tech sector
in China are the same as those in the US. In 1985, the aerospace industry
accounted for close to 50 per cent of value added in hi-tech manufacturing
in the US, whereas Office and computing machinery and Radio, television
and communications equipment together contributed just 12.25 per cent.
By 2005, the share of the latter two sectors had risen to almost 55 per
cent. Thus China's trajectory was similar to that of the global leader.
The structure of India's hi-tech sector on other hand was completely different.
What is noteworthy is the high share of pharmaceuticals in India’s hi-tech
industries. That sector accounted for 60 per cent of value added in 1985
and a massive 77 per cent in 2005. It is well known that India’s pharmaceutical
prowess came as a result of a combination of protection for domestic production,
control over the operations of foreign firms in India, and, above all,
a patenting regime that recognized process patents and not product patents.
These were all policies typical of the interventionist, import substituting
strategy of development adopted during the first three decades after Independence.
The result was the growth of a large and diverse pharmaceutical industry
which could ensure the availability of good quality drugs at prices that
were among the lowest in the world. The capacities and technological capabilities
built up during that time has meant that even though India has given up
many of these policies and today recognizes product patents as well, it
is in a position to compete globally in many drugs that are off patent
or are on the way to being so.
This
competitiveness is reflected in the growing external orientation of India’s
hi-tech sectors, possibly driven by pharmaceuticals. The ratio of exports
to revenue in the hi-tech industries rose from 7.5 to 15 per cent between
1985 and 1999, and then doubled again to 31 per cent by 2005. The period
between 2000 and 2005 was also one in which the share of pharmaceuticals
in hi-tech manufacturing value added in India rose from 61 to 77 per cent.
This suggests that pharmaceutical production and exports are the most
successful components of India’s otherwise dismal hi-tech manufacturing
performance. Office and computing machinery with its less than 1 per cent
share in 2005 and Radio, television and communications equipment with
its 11 per cent contribution to hi-tech manufacturing value added are
conspicuous by their small presence or near absence. India’s two-decade
long liberalization and "reform" programme has only worsened
its hi-tech lag. This is a feature that must be factored in when attempting
to redress the imbalance.
so.
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