Cash
transfers are the latest fad of the international development
industry, as the preferred strategy for poverty reduction. And
now Indian policy makers are busy catching up. The idea was mooted
in the Government's Economic Survey for 2010-11, and the Finance
Minister made an explicit announcement in his Budget Speech for
replacing some subsidies on goods with cash transfers.
So what exactly is this strategy all about? In the recent international
experience, cash transfers can be conditional (subject to the
households meeting certain demands) or unconditional; targeted
(given only to households or individuals meeting particular criteria)
or universal. But essentially they amount to just what they sound
like – the transfer of money to people by governments, rather
than the provision of goods and services.
The basic idea sounds so simple and easy that a toddler could
think of it: Why are people poor? Because they have no money.
So let's give them money - then they won't be poor anymore!
The proponents of cash transfers tend to present this as a radically
new idea, but it actually has a long history. Kautilya's Arthasastra
specifies a system of taxation payments from the rich in order
to enable transfer payments to the poor, including not only financial
assistance during calamities but welfare payments to the chronically
indigent and those unable to earn their own livelihood. Islamic
rulers in the Middle Ages were required to follow the tenets of
zakat, using state revenues to provide income transfers for the
poor, the elderly, orphans, widows and the disabled. Other historical
examples abound.
The purpose of cash transfer schemes is to provide poor people
with money and give them the freedom to choose what to do with
it. Of course, this then generates other choices that have to
be made: Who gets the transfers? How much do they get? If they
are universal, that usually spreads the money around rather thinly,
so they account for very little. But if they are targeted, then
the familiar problems of targeting (unfair exclusion, unjustified
inclusion, large administration costs, possibilities of leakage)
all become significant.
If they are to be effective at all, cash transfers have to be
assured, relatively easy to deliver and monitor and large enough
to affect household income. But that also means that they have
to be reasonably significant chunks of public spending. And this
begs the question of what expenditures they are replacing.
Several of the more well-known recent ''success stories'' involve
targeting and conditions on recipients that range from light to
onerous. Brazil's Bolsa Familia is a grant provided to families
with less than a threshold monthly income, with the requirement
of attendance at government clinics and 85 per cent school attendance.
The Oportunidades programme in Mexico is a highly conditional
cash transfer system based on a complex system of eligibility
(age, gender and level of education of each family member, electricity
and tap water, household assets) and requiring family members,
especially mothers, to meet various time-intensive conditions
like attending meetings and providing ''voluntary'' community
labour.
There is no doubt that progressive redistributive transfers are
desirable. Indeed, redistribution is a major, even critical element
of any fiscal system of taxation and public expenditure. Minimum
income schemes for the destitute, pension payments for the elderly,
child support grants, unemployment benefits and other forms of
social protection are obviously desirable in themselves and constitute
requirements for any civilised society, even the poorest one.
They also contribute in the short term to more effective demand
and therefore have positive multiplier effects, and in the long
term to healthier, better educated and more secure populations.
So the question then is not whether or not to oppose cash transfers
in general, but rather what specific importance to give them in
an overall strategy of development and poverty reduction. Cash
transfers cannot and should not replace the public provision of
essential goods and services, but rather supplement them. However,
the current tendency is to see this as a further excuse for the
reduction of publicly provided services, and replace them with
the administratively easier option of doling out money.
In many countries, the argument has become one of encouraging
governments to give the poor cash transfers that will allow them
to access whatever goods and services they want that are generated
by private markets, rather than struggling to ensure public provision.
Such a position completely misses the point. In Brazil, for example,
Bolsa Familia can be based on minimum school attendance only because
there are enough public (and free) schools of reasonable quality
that children of poor households can attend, which in turn means
prior and continuing public investment in quality schooling and
teacher education. Similarly, providing small amounts of cash
to allow people to visit local private quacks will hardly compensate
for the absence of a reasonably well-funded public health system
that provides access to preventive and curative services. Cash
transfers are less effective in periods of rising prices of essential
goods. And so on.
This is important, because ultimately social and economic policies
are all about choices, and this is most starkly evident in the
allocations of public expenditure. Governments typically do not
have the luxury of being able to ensure enough spending to provide
good quality public services and provide cash transfers that are
large enough to be at all meaningful. In most developing countries,
the choices to be made are not only about having good quality
schools versus transfers that incentivise parents to send their
children to school but even more basic choices: road or health
clinic; electricity or piped water; schools or higher education
institutions; one airport or many railway stations; this region
or that one?
It is evident that the agenda of the UPA government is to bring
in cash transfers to replace public distribution of various essential
items, including food. To begin with, Finance Minister Pranab
Mukherjee has proposed that the existing system of subsidies for
kerosene and fertilisers be done away with and replaced by direct
cash transfers to chosen beneficiaries.
In his speech, he said ''The Government provides subsidies, notably
on fuel and food grains, to enable the common man to have access
to these basic necessities at affordable prices. A significant
proportion of subsidised fuel does not reach the targeted beneficiaries
and there is large scale diversion of subsidised kerosene oil.
.. To ensure greater efficiency, cost effectiveness and better
delivery for both kerosene and fertilisers, the Government will
move towards direct transfer of cash subsidy to people living
below poverty line in a phased manner.''
There are two immediate problems that are evident in this approach.
First, what ensures that the amount of the transfer will be sufficient
to fully compensate for any price increases in the newly deregulated
markets of these goods? Second, how will the government ensure
that the cash transfer actually goes to those who were intended
to be the beneficiaries of the subsidised kerosene and fertiliser?
The second problem is well known in India, where all public delivery
systems have some element of leakage and diversion. How much simpler
and easier it will be to divert cash than goods that have to be
stored and resold!
The government seems to be under the delusion that a technological
fix (such as a Unique Identity number provided to all residents)
will somehow eliminate all the potential problems of targeting.
But determining who is actually poor and which farmers deserve
the cash subsidy are socio-economic decisions that are affected
by a complex set of political and social forces as well as power
relations. Technology simply cannot address those, they require
very different responses.
In India, where much of this basic part of the development project
still remains woefully incomplete, the urge to adopt this latest
international development fashion involves several risks. In the
case of choice between direct public provision of some essential
goods (like food and fuel) and cash transfers to consumers instead,
the most immediate threat is that the rising prices in these deregulated
markets will make such goods unaffordable for those who need them
the most.
Posing the problem in this way is also misleading, because it
completely leaves out the feasible and much more just alternative
of universal provision of some essential items, which would ensure
better access and create public pressure for greater accountability
in public delivery.