Priority
Sector Lending
However, the argument
of high NPAs was used to encourage banks to cut back
on lending to the priority sector. Among the directed
credit programmes followed by the banks, priority sector
lending has been perhaps one of the most effective.
In 1969, banks provided only 14.6 per cent of their
total credit to the priority sectors, with the percentage
of credit disbursed to agriculture being only 5.4 per
cent. In 1991, 40.9 per cent of net
bank credit was advanced to priority sectors, and total
credit to agriculture, even though remaining below the
prescribed level of 18 per cent, was 16.4 per cent by
1991.
Unfortunately, since 1991, there has been a reversal
of the trends in the ratio of directed credit to total
bank credit and the proportion thereof going to the
agricultural sector, even though there has been no known
formal decision by government on this score. At
the same time, serious attempts have been made in recent
years to dilute the norms of whatever remains of priority
sector bank lending.
As mentioned earlier, the Committee on the Financial
System (CFS) recommended phasing out of the bulk of
priority sector targeting by the banks. The changes
recommended by the committee in the field of priority
sector lending were as follows:
The directed credit programmes should cover a redefined
priority sector consisting of small and marginal farmers,
the tiny sector of industry, small business and transport
operators, village and cottage industries, rural artisans
and other weaker sections.
Credit targets for this redefined priority sector should
be fixed at 10 per cent of aggregate bank credit.
Stipulations of concessional interest to the redefined
priority sector should be reviewed with a view to its
eventual elimination, in about three years.
A review should be undertaken at the end of three years
to see whether the directed credit programmes need to
be continued.
While the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee
on priority sector lending were not completely accepted,
various policy measures, aimed at diluting the norms
of priority sector lending were adopted, so as to ensure
its gradual phase-out in the future.
While the authorities have allowed the target for priority
sector lending to remain untouched, they have widened
its coverage. At the same time, shortfalls relative
to targets have been overlooked. In agriculture,
both direct and indirect advances to agriculture were
clubbed together for meeting the agricultural sub-target
of 18 per cent in 1993, subject to the stipulation however
that "indirect" lending to agriculture must
not exceed one-fourth of that lending sub-target or
4.5 per cent of net bank credit.
It was also decided to include indirect agricultural
advances exceeding 4.5 per cent of net bank credit into
the overall target of 40 per cent. The definition
of priority sector itself was also widened to include
financing and distribution of inputs for agriculture
and allied sectors (dairy, poultry, livestock rearing)
with the ceiling raised to Rs. 5 lakh initially and
Rs. 15 lakh subsequently. The scope of direct agricultural
advances under priority sector lending was widened so
as to include all short-term advances to traditional
plantations including tea, coffee, rubber, and spices,
irrespective of the size of the holdings.
Apart from this, there were also totally new areas under
the umbrella of priority sector for the purpose of bank
lending. This meant that banks defaulting in meeting
the priority sector sub-target of 18 per cent of net
credit to agriculture, would make good the deficiency
by contributing to various other institutions such as
the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund of NABARD.
They could also make investments in special bonds issued
by institutions like State Financial Corporations and
treat such investments as priority sector advances.
The changes thus made in the policy guidelines on the
subject of priority sector lending were obviously meant
to enable the banks to move away from the responsibility
of directly lending to the priority sectors of the economy.
It is in the light of this that the trends in priority
sector lending during the post liberalisation period
of 1991-2001 should be understood.
Priority sector lending as a proportion of net bank
credit, after reaching the target of 40 per cent in
1991, had been continuously falling short of target
till 1996. It has subsequently been in excess of the
target for the reasons specified above, and stood at
43 per cent in 2001, which was mainly due to the
inclusion of funds provided to
Regional Rural Banks by their sponsoring
banks, that were eligible to be treated as priority
sector advances. Advances to agriculture
also declined from 16.4 per cent in 1991 to 15.3 per
cent in 2002, well below the target of 18 per cent of
net bank credit. In the year ending March 2003, direct
agricultural advances amounted to only 10.8 per cent
of net public sector bank credit.
The
fall in the ratio of priority sector lending to deposits
from 26.6 per cent in 1991 to 22.8 per cent in 2001
was partly due to the decline in the overall credit
deposit ratio of banks and partly due to the decline
in the ratio of priority sector advances to total bank
credit.
Private banks in general and foreign banks in particular
have been lax in meeting regulatory norms. The sector
most affected was agriculture, in whose case private
bank lending amounted to just 10.8 per cent of net credit,
which was far short of the stipulated 18 per cent in
the year ending March 2003. Direct agricultural advances
were only 6.3 per cent of net private sector bank credit.
Within the private sector, the foreign banks were the
major defaulters. According to the annual report of
RBI, the advances of foreign banks to the priority sector
were only 34 per cent of net credit in the year ending
March 2003. Here again, agriculture was the prime area
of neglect. Foreign banks' performance on credit to
the small scale industries and export sectors was much
better, with lending to these sectors accounting for
9 and 19 per cent, respectively, of the net bank credit
against the sub-sectoral targets of 10 per cent and
12 per cent.
Clearly, even to the extent that priority-sector lending
targets had been met, the choice was in favour of the
more cost effective and profitable sectors. Overall,
nearly 60 per cent of the priority sector lending by
foreign banks was directed towards export credit.
The difficulty is that, faced with the demands made
on them by the advocates of liberalisation and the effects
of competition from the private sector banks, banks
in the public sector are also being forced to change.
They are trying to trim operating expenses, by reducing
the wage bill by reducing employment through retrenchment
under the VRS scheme and computerisation. They are also
seeking to reduce costs by limiting branch expansion
and reducing the number of bank branches.
The latter, which affects the rural areas first, reduces
access to credit in rural areas that were well-served
by the post-nationalisation branch expansion drive,
and worsens the tendency towards reduced provision of
credit to the agricultural sector.
In consequence of all this, the formal credit squeeze
upon Indian agriculture is now acute. This has led to
severe problems of accessing working capital for cultivators,
and has also meant the revival of private money lending
in rural areas. Such retrogression has extremely disturbing
implications for the future of Indian agriculture.