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FDI
and the Balance of Payments in the 2000s |
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Mar
10th 2010, C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh |
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A
major component of the economic reform initiated in
the 1990s was, and remains, the liberalisation of regulations
relating to the inflow and terms of operation of foreign
direct investment (FDI). An important reason for seeking
to attract such capital is the belief that such inflows,
besides enhancing the level of foreign exchange reserves
in the short run, would use India as a base for world
market production, improve the competitiveness of Indian
industry, increase exports and render the balance of
payments sustainable in the medium and long term. As
a result, successive governments have sought to better
past records in terms of the annual inflow of such investments.
Chart
1 >>
It cannot be denied that these efforts at attracting
inflows have been successful. While there is reason
to be wary about treating all recorded FDI as consisting
of capital entering the country with a long-term, productive
interest, especially since it requires just 10 per cent
equity by a single foreign investor for a firm to be
treated as a foreign direct investment company (FDIC),
a substantial inflow of capital under this head cannot
be denied. FDI inflows which stood at about $2 billion
in the middle of the 1990s and touched $4 billion in
2000-01 rose sharply to $6 billion in 2004-05, and then
registered a sharp spike to touch $22.8 billion in 2006-07,
$34.8 billion in 2007-08, and $35.3 billion in 2008-09
(Chart 1).
Not
all of this, it must be noted, is investment in greenfield
projects. In the wake of liberalisation of ceilings
on foreign shareholding, from the 40 per cent level
required for national treatment under FERA, a number
of companies already in operation in the country raised
the foreign stake in their paid-up capital through issue
of new shares to the foreign investor.
Further, there have been a large number of cases of
foreign firms acquiring wholly Indian ones. Data relating
to inflows on account of acquisition of shares of Indian
companies by non-residents under section 29 of FERA
and Section 6 of FEMA is available from January 1996.
While the share of FDI inflows on this account has been
substantial in some years, accounting for 23 per cent
of the total in 2006-07 for example, the figure has
generally been around 15 per cent of the total.
Table
1 >>
The
fact that FDI inflows do not always reflect investments
in greenfield projects is not without significance.
Both foreign firms set up during the years when FERA
limited foreign shareholding to 40 per cent and Indian
companies established during the import substitution
phase of Indian industrialisation were created with
the domestic market as their primary targets. In the
case of foreign firms, quantitative restrictions and
high tariffs forced those that could earlier service
the Indian market with exports from the parent or third-country
subsidiaries to jump tariff barriers and set up capacity
within the domestic tariff area in defence of existing
markets. On the other hand, the large market ‘opened
up’ to domestic entrepreneurs by protection, which was
expanding as a result of state investment and expenditure,
provided a major stimulus for the creation of new indigenous
firms by Indian industrialists to cater to the local
market. The net result was that even when the world
market for manufactures was expanding quite rapidly
in the 1950s and 1960s, both foreign-owned and domestic
firms from India were conspicuous by their absence in
international markets.
Table
2 >>
Given the evolution of these firms, it should be expected
that any increase in the equity stake of the foreign
investors in existing joint ventures or purchase of
a share of equity by them in domestic firms does not
automatically change the orientation of the firm. As
a result, in such cases FDI inflows need not be accompanied
by any substantial increase in exports, whether such
investment leads to the modernisation of domestic capacity
or not. Moreover, if the domestic market is attractive
for these firms, there is no reason to believe that
when the market is expanding and diversifying rapidly,
foreign investors in greenfield projects too (such as
in automobiles or telecommunications) would not target
the domestic market.
The
available evidence suggests that this is precisely what
is occurring in India. The Reserve Bank of India has
periodically been publishing figures on the finances
of Foreign Direct Investment Companies (FDICs), or companies
in which a single non-resident investor has 10 per cent
or more shares, for different sets of years since the
1990s. These firms are those, with the requisite foreign
equity holding, included in the RBI’s studies of the
finances of a larger sample of public and private limited
companies. It must be mentioned that neither do these
data sets amount to a comprehensive census of FDICs
nor are they a consistent sample in the sense that the
firms covered remain the same in all years. The number
of firms covered in each year’s selective survey, which
provides data for two or three consecutive years for
a common set of firms, varies over time. So the series
is not strictly comparable over a long period. However,
the numbers are indicative.
Table 1 provides details on movements in the exports
sales ratio for these sets of firms for the period 2001-02
to 2007-08. What the numbers indicate is that in the
period when FDI inflows into India have been rising
rapidly, the export intensity of FDICs has been more
or less stable. This fact counters the presumption of
many who argue that, in the context of globalisation,
FDI flows reflect the need of large international firms
to seek out the best locations for world market production,
resulting in a virtuous nexus between FDI and exports.
But this is not all. Since the relaxation of controls
on FDI inflows under reform is accompanied by the liberalisation
of the rules governing the operation of foreign firms
and is accompanied by substantial trade liberalisation,
we can expect two tendencies. First, there could be
greater expenditure of foreign exchange by these firms
on imported inputs. Second, there could be greater expenditure
of foreign exchange because of the larger payments on
account of royalties and technical fees and larger repatriation
of profits as dividends encouraged by the more liberalised
environment.
Chart
2 >>
The first of these is most likely. To start with, foreign
firms would seek to use trade liberalisation and the
liberalisation of regulations with regard to use of
international brand names, to cash in on the pent-up
demand among the more well-to-do for a range of product
innovations available in the international market place,
access to which was restricted in the protectionist
phase. Even if the market for this range of ‘new’ products
is small, they can be ‘manufactured’ and sold in the
domestic market with relatively small investments at
the penultimate stages of production, based on imported
intermediates and components. Not surprisingly, therefore,
as Table 2 indicates, the ratio of imports to exports
from FDICs has been rising rapidly. This trend could
also reflect the possibility that reduced restrictions
on imports are intensifying the practice of ‘transfer
pricing’ or imports from the parent or a third-country
subsidiary located in a tax haven at inflated prices,
so that profits are ‘transferred’ to firms in low tax
locations. This obviously implies that the foreign exchange
cost of domestic production is inflated further.
These
factors operate together with the tendency to extract
larger payments in the form of more ‘open’ transfers
such as royalties and technical fees. For all these
reasons, the operations of foreign firms can result
in a significant drain of foreign exchange. To the extent
that these tendencies are associated with investments
focused on exploiting the domestic market, there would
be little by way of enhanced foreign exchange earnings
to neutralise their adverse balance of payments consequences.
In the event, the net balance of payments impact of
FDI inflows can be negative.
Chart
3 >>
As
is clear from Chart 2, which provides three year average
figures for a common set of firms, there has been a
sharp increase in the net outflow of foreign exchange
(or a negative value for total foreign exchange earnings
minus foreign exchange expenditures) on account of the
operation of FDICs in the country between 2002-03 and
2006-07. This holds true even if we normalise these
figures with the total income earned by these firms,
with net earnings moving from a positive 3.4 per cent
in 2001-02 to a negative 9.1 per cent in 2006-07, where
the figures again are three-year averages (Chart 3).
It could, of course, be argued that the drain of foreign
exchange on account of the operations of these firms
is more than matched by the additional inflow in the
form of equity capital. This argument, however, confuses
the immediate inflow on account of foreign investment
and the long-term impact of the operation of an FDIC.
It is well known that foreign capital inflows into joint
ventures in developing countries are in the nature of
large one-time flows for establishing or substantially
expanding an enterprise accompanied by smaller ‘in effect’
inflows on account of retention of part of the profits
due to the foreign partner, which are not paid out as
dividends.
Once established, much of the expansion of the firm
occurs on the basis of borrowing from the domestic market.
Such expansion results in an increase in the fixed assets,
sales and profits of the company concerned, which in
turn increases outflows on account of imports and non-import
foreign exchange expenditures like royalties that are
tied to sales volumes.
Thus, unless export revenues increase significantly
and bring in additional foreign exchange revenues, net
inflows that are positive at the time when equity is
flowing in soon turn negative, and within a short period
cumulative inflows are negative. It is for this reason
that the cumulative foreign exchange impact of foreign
investments targeted at domestic markets inevitably
tends to be negative. There is no reason to believe
that the story is different with respect to FDI flows
into India after liberalisation.
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